University of Miami Law School

University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository
Articles

Faculty and Deans

1991

The Lockett Paradox: Reconciling Guided
Discretion and Unguided Mitigation in Capital
Sentencing
Scott E. Sundby
University of Miami School of Law, ssundby@law.miami.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/fac_articles
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the Criminal Procedure Commons

Recommended Citation
Scott E. Sundby, The Lockett Paradox: Reconciling Guided Discretion and Unguided Mitigation in Capital Sentencing, 38 UCLA L. Rev.
1147 (1991).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty and Deans at University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. For more
information, please contact library@law.miami.edu.

THE LOCKETT PARADOX: RECONCILING
GUIDED DISCRETION AND UNGUIDED
MITIGATION IN CAPITAL
SENTENCING

Scott E. Sundby*

1148
1150

INTRODUCTION ...........................................

I.

A.
B.

II.

; ....
Furman and Gregg: The Federalizationof Who is
"Death Eligible". ................................ 1150
Lockett v. Ohio: The Federalizationof Mitigating
Circumstances ................................... 1156

THE CREATION STORY .........................

THE TENSION BETWEEN "INDIVIDUALIZED
CONSIDERATION" AND "GUIDED DISCRETION": CAN

THEY BE RECONCILED? .

. . . . .. . . . .. .. . . . .. . . . . .. . . . .

A. The Two Stages of the Death Penalty Decision ....
B. Justice Scalia's Callfor Overruling Lockett v.
Ohio ............................................
1. The Eighth Amendment and the Principle of
Individualized Consideration .................
2. Woodson-Lockett and the Ban on Unbridled
Discretion ...................................
C. The Consequences of Overruling Lockett ..........

.

1160
1160
1164
1168
1174
1186

III. THE ATTACK ON LOCKETT'S REARGUARD:
CONTROLLING THE SUBSTANCE THROUGH THE

PROCEDURE .........................................

A.
B.

1190

The Rise of the Substance-ProcedureDistinction .. 1190
Telling the Sentencer How to Decide: What is the
Nature of the Death Penalty Decision? ............ 1196

* Professor of Law, University of California-Hastings College of the Law. I am
grateful to Professors David Faigman, William Geimer, Joseph Grodin, Joseph Hoffmann, Calvin Massey, and Louis Schwartz for providing helpful comments on earlier

drafts.

1147

1148

UCLA LAW REVIEW
C.

[Vol. 38:1147

Telling the "What" From the "How" ............

CONCLUSION ..............................................

1199

1206

INTRODUCTION

The United States Supreme Court has based its eighth amendment jurisprudence governing the death penalty on two fundamental commandments. The first commandment of "guided discretion"
requires that the sentencer's discretion be narrowly guided as to
which circumstances subject a defendant to the imposition of the
death penalty. The second commandment of "individualized consideration" mandates that the sentencer be allowed to consider all
evidence concerning the offender and the offense that might argue
for a sentence less than death. These principles of guided discretion
and individualized consideration comprise almost the entire foundation upon which the Court has built its framework of constitutional
rules regulating the death penalty. With only a touch of hyperbole,
Furman v. Georgia I and Gregg v. Georgia,2 which established the
principle of guided discretion, and Woodson v. North Carolina3 and
Lockett v. Ohio,4 which developed the doctrine of individualized
consideration, might be described as the Court's Holy Text for the
eighth amendment, and its later holdings might be described primarily as attempts to apply the Text's teachings to different
situations.
Within the Court, however, eighth amendment principles that
previously had been considered sacrosanct are being challenged.
Justice Scalia, in particular, has proclaimed that he no longer will
abide by the teachings of Woodson-Lockett and their underlying
principle of individualized consideration. 5 Indeed, Justice Scalia
has declared that after examining the principles of guided discretion
and individualized consideration, he has found them to hopelessly
conflict with each other. The two principles which have existed for
over a decade as the yin and yang of the eighth amendment now are
being starkly contrasted by one of the High Priests as " 'twin objectives'... like.., the twin objectives of good and evil. They cannot
'6
be reconciled."
1. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
2. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).

3. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
4. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
5. Walton v. Arizona, 110 S.Ct. 3047, 3068 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring).
6. Id. at 3063 (citation omitted). Justice Scalia's discontent with the Court's current eighth amendment jurisprudence does not stop with Woodson and Lockett, the

subjects of this Article. He also has advocated overruling the Court's cases prohibiting
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Although Justice Scalia's call for abandoning Woodson and
Lockett has yet to command majority support, the Court has been
moving into a new phase of eighth amendment jurisprudence concerning the death penalty. The immediate post-Furman era was
marked by an active development of principles that generated rules
and procedures for the states to follow. In contrast, the contemporary view of the eighth amendment increasingly is of an amendment
that merely marks out general constitutional boundaries within
which the states are free to operate. 7 In a corresponding fashion,
although Furman-Gregg and Woodson-Lockett still stand at the
center of the Court's eighth amendment jurisprudence, their preeminence as sources for new constitutional limits on death penalty
practices has begun to dim. The Court appears to be adopting a
position that more closely resembles its usual constitutional approach to substantive criminal law issues; an approach generally
characterized by great reluctance and misgiving. 8
This Article will examine some of the changes taking place in
the Court's eighth amendment jurisprudence by focusing on the
the use of evidence concerning victim attributes at capital sentencing hearings, see
South Carolina v. Gathers, 109 S. Ct. 2207, 2217-18 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting), and
has argued for a much more restrictive analysis of whether the death penalty is disproportional to certain crimes and offenders, see Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361,
371-72 (1989) (plurality opinion). Indeed, Justice Scalia's questioning of existing doctrine in almost all areas of the law has turned Scalia opinions into a cottage industry for
the academic community. See generally The Jurisprudenceof JusticeAntonin Scalia, 12
CARDOZO L. REV. (forthcoming 1991); Smith, Justice Antonin Scalia and the Institutions of American Government, 25 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 783 (1990); Note, Mother of
Mercy--Is this the End of RICO--Justice Scalia Invites Constitutional Void-for- Vagueness Challenge to RICO "Pattern",65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1106 (1990).
7. See generally Geimer, Death at Any Cost: A Critique of the Supreme Court's
Recent Retreat from its Death Penalty Standards, 12 FLA. ST. L. REV. 737 (1985);
Weisberg, Deregulating Death, 1983 Sup. CT. REV. 305. The trend has been exacerbated by the Court's recent rulings curtailing the availability of federal habeas relief to
state prisoners and making it more difficult to raise new challenges based on the federal
constitution. See generally Teague v. Lane, 109 S. Ct. 1060 (1989) (federal habeas relief
may not be granted for claims based on "new" constitutional rules); Hoffmann, Retroactivity and the Great Writ: How Congress Should Respond to Teague v. Lane, 1990
B.Y.U. L. REV. 183, 210-17 (noting need to modify Teague to vindicate federal constitutional rights).
8. The Court's reticence in addressing substantive criminal law issues primarily
reflects concerns with intruding on states' rights and legislative prerogatives. Consequently, the definition of crimes and the level of punishment have remained almost
exclusively the province of state legislatures. See generally Nesson, Rationality, Presumptions, and Judicial Comment: A Response to Professor Allen, 94 HARV. L. REV.
1574, 1580-81 (1981) (noting the Court's reluctance to impose substantive limitations
on the definition and punishment of crimes); Sundby, The Reasonable Doubt Rule and
the Meaning of Innocence, 40 HAST. L.J. 457, 475-87 (1989) (examining the Court's
general reluctance to develop substantive limitations in the criminal law area).
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Court's recent interpretations of Lockett v. Ohio's requirement that
the sentencer must be allowed to consider all mitigating evidence
calling for a sentence less than death. Part One provides a basis for
understanding Lockett's holding and its place within the Court's
development of eighth amendment law by briefly tracing the evolution of the Court's decisions leading to Lockett. Part Two addresses
Justice Scalia's argument in Walton v. Arizona for overruling Lockett and his declaration that he will no longer abide by its holding.
Justice Scalia's opinion provides an excellent opportunity to reexamine Lockett's underpinnings and to ask whether the holding has
a proper place in the Court's eighth amendment jurisprudence.
Finally, Part Three looks at the Court's recent cases involving
Lockett issues and its development of a substance-procedure distinction for assessing whether a state's rule affecting the sentencer's
consideration of mitigating evidence violates Lockett. The substance-procedure distinction raises difficult questions regarding the
interaction between the objectives of Furman and Lockett and has
important implications for the Court's general approach to capital
punishment. Perhaps most importantly, the distinction ultimately
may provide an indirect means to accomplish much of Justice
Scalia's goal of removing Lockett's restrictions on state death penalty procedures. The picture that emerges in the. end is one of a
constitutional doctrine that has enjoyed a period of vigorous growth
but now is in danger of slowly being whittled away, perhaps to the
point of extinction.

I.
A.

THE CREATION STORY

Furman and Gregg: The Federalization of Who is "Death
Eligible"

The United States Supreme Court often hands down landmark
decisions that throw an area of the law into a state of flux, but
rarely does the Court simply wipe the constitutional slate clean and
declare that it is starting over. 9 Such was the effect, however, when
the Court in Furman v. Georgia 1o struck down Georgia's death penalty scheme because the unbridled discretion given the sentencer in
9. Such a rare example is Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954),
when the Court abandoned the "separate but equal" doctrine to find that school segregation violated the Equal Protection Clause of the fourteenth amendment. See generally Powell, Stare Decisis and JudicialRestraint, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 281, 284-85
(1990) (Justice Powell discussing infrequency of the overruling of major decisions in
both the Warren and Burger Courts).
10. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
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imposing the death penalty led to "arbitrary and capricious" results."' The Court's decision was by a narrow five-to-four margin,
with each of the nine Justices writing a separate opinion.1 2
The fragmented nature of the Court's decision created great
uncertainty over the constitutional future of capital punishment.
The holding was not so much a consensus of opinion as a coalition
of differing views. Language combed from the various opinions
yielded support for positions ranging from a conclusion that the
death penalty was always unconstitutional to an argument that the
only constitutional form of capital punishment was a mandatory
3
death penalty. 1
Furman was significant not only because it condemned the
Georgia statute for failing to guide the capital sentencer, but also
because the Court found that the eighth amendment allowed it to
make such a determination in the first place. The five justices invalidating the statute won a closely fought battle over the threshold
question of whether the eighth amendment even permitted the
Court to pass judgment on the constitutionality of a state's procedures for imposing the death penalty.14 The Court was but one vote
shy of finding that the eighth amendment's ban on "cruel and unusual punishment" primarily was limited to forms and modes of punishment. Further inquiries would have been beyond the Court's
power to implement the amendment's command.' 5
11. Id. at 256-57 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring);
id. at 314 (Marshall, J., concurring). Three justices, Justices White, Stewart and Douglas, voted to invalidate on the basis of the unguided discretion given the sentencer, while
two justices, Justices Brennan and Marshall, maintained that the death penalty was a
per se violation of the eighth amefidment.
12. In fact, there was not even a plurality opinion, as none of the concurring justices joined any of the other opinions.
13. Compare, e.g., the opinions of Justices Brennan and Marshall, 408 U.S. at
269-306, 360-71 (the death penalty always violates the eighth amendment), with Chief
Justice Burger's dissent, id. at 401 (expressing concern that Furman may be interpreted
as allowing only mandatory death penalties).
14. Although the four dissenters each wrote separate opinions, they were united on
the contention that the majority had overstepped proper judicial bounds. Justice Powell, for example, argued that the majority violated "root principles of stare decisis, federalism, judicial restraint and-most importantly-separation of powers." Id. at 417.
Both Justice Rehnquist's and Justice Powell's dissents, which stressed the argument
that the majority had exceeded the Court's power, were joined by the other three
dissenters.
15. The dissenter's basic position on the proper scope of the Court's role under the
eighth amendment perhaps was best summarized by Justice Harlan in a case decided
the previous term:
It may well be, as the American Law Institute and the National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws have concluded, that bifur-
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If a majority in Furman had arrived at such a conclusion, the
change in outcome would have had a dramatic effect. In contrast to
the post-Furman development of detailed constitutional rules controlling when and how the death penalty is imposed, the Court's
eighth amendment jurisprudence would have more closely resem16 Most
bled its reticent treatment of other criminal law issues.
likely, the Court would have engaged in infrequent constitutional
excursions without any significant development of overreaching
constitutional principles. 17 Thus by finding that the eighth amendment reached the process for determining who received the death
penalty, Furman firmly placed the Court in the role of constitutional overseer of how the death penalty would be implemented in
the future.
If Furman was the legal equivalent of the Big Bang for capital
punishment, it was the states who were given the initial task of
bringing order to the chaos, and a large number tried.1 8 Like shamans studying a talisman, legislatures examined Furman and tried
to divine the constitutional fate of the death penalty. Some states
read the Court's concern over "arbitrary and capricious" death
sentences as a mandate to eliminate sentencer discretion altogether
and therefore implemented mandatory death penalties for specified
cated trials and criteria for jury sentencing discretion are superior means
of dealing with capital cases if the death penalty is to be retained at all.
But the Federal Constitution, which marks the limits of our authority in
these cases, does not guarantee trial procedures that are the best of all
worlds, or that accord with the most enlightened ideas of students of the
infant science of criminology, or even those that measure up to the individual predilections of members of this Court. The Constitution requires
no more than that trials be fairly conducted and that guaranteed rights of
defendants be scrupulously respected.
McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 221 (1971) (citation omitted). Indeed, part of
the dissents' complaint that the majority was ignoring stare decisis was premised on the
Court's rejection in McGautha just the term before of a due process challenge to the
death penalty based on the sentencer's unguided discretion. Furman, 408 U.S. at 400
(Burger, C. J., dissenting) ("[ ]twould be disingenuous to suggest that today's ruling
has done anything less than overrule McGautha in the guise of an Eighth Amendment
adjudication.").
16. See supra note 8.
17. This largely was the judiciary's approach to the death penalty prior to Furman.
See generally Poulos, The Supreme Court, Capital Punishment and the Substantive
CriminalLaw: The Rise and Fall of Mandatory CapitalPunishment, 28 ARIZ. L. REV.
143, 146-58 (1986).
18. From the time that Furman was decided in 1972 until the Court upheld the
first post-Furman death penalty statute in 1976, thirty-five states and Congress had
enacted new death penalty statutes. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179-80 (1976).
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crimes.1 9 Other legislatures responded by attempting to provide
greater guidance to the sentencer as to when to impose the death
penalty. 20 The procedures for guidance varied in form, but the substantive factors making the penalty applicable were relatively uniform. 2 1 The various responses to Furman were then presented to
the Supreme Court to receive their constitutional grades.
The Court's response in Gregg v. Georgia and its companion
cases is now a familiar story. Mandatory death penalties failed because they completely precluded individualized consideration of the
defendant and the offense. 22 Guided discretion schemes, in contrast, satisfied Furman's concerns by limiting the class of defendants who were, as they are euphemistically called, "death
eligible."' 23 Gregg and its companion cases thus laid out the basic
eighth amendment parameters for capital punishment: the sentencer's discretion must be controlled as to when the death penalty
can be imposed, but sufficient discretion must remain so that the
death penalty is not imposed without an opportunity to consider the
specific circumstances of the defendant and the crime.
Furman and Gregg were crucial steps in the federalization of
the death penalty. Although its promise largely has gone unfulfilled, by making the question of whether discretion was adequately
19. Twenty-two states responded to Furman by enacting mandatory death penalty
schemes. Poulos, supra note 17, at 200.
20. See Poulos, supra note 17, at 199 n.461 & Table 1.
21. Procedures vary, for example, over whether the jury or judge imposes the death
penalty, compare FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(3) (West 1985) (trial judge imposes penalty) with GA. CODE ANN. § 26-3102 (1983) (jury is sentencing body), and as to how
the decision is posed to the sentencer, compare TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
37.071(4) (Vernon 1981) (sentencer required to answer three specific questions) with
GA. CODE ANN. § 26-3102 (1983) (jury given discretion to weigh evidence in deciding
to impose death penalty). Despite the variance in procedures, however, the aggravating
factors making the defendant eligible for the death penalty are quite uniform. See infra
note 26 and accompanying text.
22. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) ("[uIn capital cases the
fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment requires consideration of the character and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of
the particular offense as a constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting
the penalty of death." (citation omitted)); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 333-34
(1976) (sentencer must be given "meaningful opportunity for consideration of mitigating factors presented by the circumstances of the particular crime or by the attributes of
the individual offender." (footnote omitted)). For further discussion of mandatory
death penalties, see infra notes 74-92 and accompanying text.
23. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 196-98 (1976) (plurality opinion) (approving
Georgia's death penalty scheme because jury discretion controlled by objective standards). In addition to Georgia's statute, the Court also approved the guided discretion
statutes enacted by Florida, Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976) (plurality opinion)
and Texas, Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976) (plurality opinion).
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controlled an eighth amendment issue, the Court was in a position
to significantly standardize determinations of who became eligible
for the death penalty. The eighth amendment now required review
of a state's use of aggravating factors both to ensure that the factors
sufficiently narrowed who was death eligible 24 and to ascertain
whether the aggravating factors could support the weight of the
death penalty in terms of severity and penological justification. 25
The aggravating circumstances used in death penalty statutes became quite uniform among the states adopting capital punishment
26
schemes.
24. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 200-02 (reviewing several of Georgia's aggravating circumstances for vagueness); see also Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 363-64 (1988)
("especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel" aggravating circumstance not adequately narrowed by judicial interpretation); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 432-33 (1980)
("outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman" aggravating circumstance inadequately channels sentencer discretion).
25. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173, 182-87 (eighth amendment requires Court to decide
whether death penalty is disproportionate to severity of crime); see, e.g., Enmund v.
Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982) (death penalty disproportionate for non-triggerman convicted of felony-murder who did not intend to kill); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584
(1977) (plurality opinion) (death penalty disproportionate for rape). For further discussion, see infra notes 85-89 and accompanying text.
26. Several reasons may explain the uniformity. The states may have been simply
asking the question, "which aggravating factors adequately support the death penalty
and distinguish who is eligible?" and arrived at similar answer, or they may have been
cautious out of a fear of unconstitutionality, or they may have lacked imagination. Certainly the similarity in aggravating circumstances is due in part to the Model Penal
Code, which provided a guided discretion model statute for the states to use after
Furman was decided. See generally Poulos, supra note 17, at 192-200 (describing
Code's effect on capital sentencing statutes). Even the Texas statute which appears to
depart significantly from the Code's model by basically limiting the sentencer to questions of the defendant's intent and future dangerousness, incorporates many of the
Code's aggravating factors through its definition of what constitutes capital murder.
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071 (Vernon 1981): The eight MPC aggravating
circumstances thus are used by most death penalty jurisdictions in some form:
Aggravating Circumstances
a. The murder was committed by a convict under sentence of
imprisonment.
b. The defendant was previously convicted of another murder or of a
felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person.
c. At the time the murder was committed the defendant also committed
another murder.
d. The defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to many
persons.
e. The murder was committed while the defendant was engaged or was
an accomplice in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight
after committing or attempting to commit robbery, rape or deviate

sexual intercourse by force or threat of force, arson, burglary or
kidnapping.
f. The murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a
lawful arrest or effecting an escape from lawful custody.
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Less certain after Gregg were the constitutional rules governing
the mitigating side of the ledger, namely the controls that a state
placed on the sentencer's consideration of evidence arguing against
a sentence of death. Many states had responded to the Court's
command of 'some discretion but not too much,' by specifying
which mitigating factors the sentencer was allowed to use. 27 Such a
scheme had a certain symmetrical appeal: just as the state controlled sentencer discretion over which defendants were death eligible through an eighth amendment approved list of aggravating
factors, so too it limited the sentencer's discretion as to who was
removed from the death penalty pool by specifying mitigating factors. Apparently the Ohio Legislature had reasoned in such a manner when it passed the capital punishment statute under which
Sandra Lockett was sentenced to death, 28 limiting the sentencer's
g. The murder was committed for pecuniary gain.
h. The murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel, manifesting exceptional depravity.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6(3) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). Studies indicate that
the vast majority of defendants become death eligible because of the felony-murder (circumstance (e)) and vile murder (circumstance (h)) circumstances. See Baldus, Pulaski
& Woodworth, Arbitrarinessand Discrimination in the Administration of the Death Penalty: A Challenge to State Supreme Courts, 15 STETSON L. REV. 133, 138-39 (1986).
27. As with aggravating circumstances, see supra note 26, the MPC provided a
sample list of mitigating circumstances that was widely used:
Mitigating Circumstances
a. The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity.
b. The murder was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance.
c. The victim was a participant in the defendant's homicidal conduct or
consented to the homicidal act.
d. The murder was committed under circumstances which the defendant
believed to provide a moral justification or extenuation for his
conduct.
e. The defendant was an accomplice in a murder committed by another
person and his participation in the homicidal act was relatively minor.
f. The defendant acted under duress or under the domination of another
person.
g. At the time of the murder, the capacity of the defendant to appreciate
the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was impaired as a result of mental
disease or defect or intoxication.
h. The youth of the defendant at the time of the crime.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6(4) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). The Model Penal
Code, however, did not limit the sentencer to the list of mitigating circumstances, but
allowed consideration of "any other facts that it deems relevant." Id. at § 210.6(2).
28. According to the statutory history described in Lockett, prior to Furman the
Ohio House of Representatives had passed a bill setting up a guided discretion system
that did not limit the mitigating circumstances which the sentencer could consider.
Furman was decided while the House bill was before the Ohio Senate, and the Senate,
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consideration to three mitigating factors (provocation, duress and
29
mental deficiency).
B.

Lockett v. Ohio: The Federalizationof Mitigating
Circumstances

If the Court was looking to establish the proposition that limiting consideration of mitigating evidence might lead to an unwarranted imposition of the death penalty, Lockett's facts provided a
favorable setting. The record raised a distinct possibility that Lockett had been only a minor participant in the robbery leading to the
victim's death and that the jury had convicted her of capital murder
on an aiding and abetting theory rather than specifically finding that
she intended or contemplated that a killing would occur.30 Moreover, Lockett had no significant prior record and was making progress in overcoming drug addiction. Psychological examinations
had shown her to be mentally normal with a favorable prognosis for
rehabilitation.I The coup de grace was that these very factors that
made her rehabilitation prognosis favorable actually deprived her of
a chance to qualify for the only statutory mitigating factor available
under the case's facts, that the offense was "primarily the product of
apparently in reaction to Furman, eliminated the sentencer's discretion to consider mitigating circumstances. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 599-600 n.7 (1978).
29. The Ohio Statute provided that:
Regardless of whether one or more of the aggravating circumstances...
[is] proved beyond a reasonable doubt, the death penalty for aggravated
murder is precluded when, considering the nature and circumstances of
the offense and the history, character, and condition of the offender, one
or more of the following is established by a [preponderance] of the
evidence:
1. The victim of the offense induced or facilitated it.
2. It is unlikely that the offense would have been committed, but for the
fact that the offender was under duress, coercion, or strong
provocation.
3. The offense was primarily the product of the offender's psychosis or
mental deficiency, though such condition is insufficient to establish the
defense of insanity.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(B) (Baldwin 1975), quoted in Lockett, 438 U.S. at
609 app.
Although the Ohio statute strictly limited what constituted a valid mitigating factor, it did provide that once the factor was found, the sentencer could not impose the
death penalty. In contrast, schemes based upon the MPC, such as Georgia's, required
the sentencer to weigh the mitigating evidence against the aggravating circumstances.
See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 197-98.
30. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 589-93. There was some evidence that Lockett had not
even stayed with the getaway car during the robbery, but had gone to get something to
eat. Id. at 594 n.2 (summarizing presentence report).
31. Id. at 594.
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psychosis or mental deficiency." ' 32 Nor was Lockett's appeal hurt
that the sentencing judge apparently felt unduly restrained by the
statute's limited mitigating factors when he stated that he found
"no alternative, whether [he] like[d] the law or not" to imposing the
33
death penalty.
Chief Justice Burger's plurality opinion3 4 is best characterized
as an evidentiary ruling on what mitigating evidence is constitutionally relevant for the sentencer to consider when deciding whether to
impose the death penalty. 35 The Chief Justice began his opinion by
drawing two lessons from the Court's previous holdings: first, imposition of the death penalty requires greater reliability than other
penalties, and, second, the Court's decisions striking down
mandatory death penalties had established that at least some aspects of the "individual offender or the circumstances of the particular offense" were constitutionally relevant. 36 The Court's task in
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Although the Chief Justice's opinion commanded only four votes, Justice Marshall clearly agreed with the plurality's objection that the Ohio Statute did not allow
individualized consideration. Id. at 620-21 (Marshall, J., concurring in judgment). He
refused to formally concur in the plurality opinion, however, because he could not share
the plurality's "assumption" that the death penalty could ever be applied fairly. Id. at
621. Cf. Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 191 n.1 (1988) (Stevens, J., dissenting)

(Lockett has precedential value of majority opinion because concurrence was on broader
grounds).
Calling a Supreme Court opinion in the death penalty area a plurality or majority
opinion is often a tricky proposition. Justices Marshall and Brennan (Justice Brennan
did not participate in Lockett) have stood steadfastly by their position in Gregg that the
death penalty is always unconstitutional, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 227, 231
(1976), and consequently often concur in a judgment reversing a death penalty but not
in the opinion. For example, in Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 600 (1977), Justices
Brennan and Marshall concurred in the judgment finding that the death penalty was
disproportionate for a rapist, but on the grounds that the death penalty was always
unconstitutional. Presumably they agreed with the plurality opinion that the death penalty was in fact disproportionate for rape, but because they concurred only in the judgment, Justice White's opinion was rendered a "plurality" opinion. Justice Marshall's
Lockett concurrence had the same effect of making Chief Justice Burger's reasoning
only a plurality opinion.
35. Although Lockett is an eighth amendment case, its premise that the defendant
must be allowed to present certain types of mitigating evidence because it is reliable and
relevant has strong parallels to the Court's due process ruling that "an essential component of procedural fairness is an opportunity to be heard." Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S.
683, 690 (1986) (state must allow defendant to present "competent, reliable evidence
bearing on credibility of a confession when such evidence is central to the defendant's
claim of innocence."). Lockett differs, of course, in that the evidence essential to the
defendant being heard goes to the claim that the death penalty is not justified rather
than to a claim of innocence.
36. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 602-04 (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S.
280, 304 (1976)).
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Lockett, according to the Chief Justice, was to take the next step
beyond these holdings and answer the questions of exactly "which
facets of an offender or his offense [are] deemed 'relevant' in capital
sentencing [and] what degree of consideration of 'relevant facets'
[is] require[d]." ' 37 His answer was a broad one: "the sentencer, in
all but the rarest kind of capital case, [can]not be precluded from
considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's
character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that
38
the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.
By limiting the sentencer's consideration of mitigating circumstances, the Chief Justice concluded, statutes like Ohio's "create[d]
the risk that the death penalty will be imposed in spite of factors
'39
which may call for a less severe penalty."
Although the Lockett Court certainly was correct that its decision was rooted in the principle of individualized punishment that
had led the Court to find mandatory death penalties unconstitutional, Lockett broadened the principle. In declaring the
mandatory death penalty unconstitutional, the Court simply had
said that the state could not preclude consideration of all mitigating
evidence. 40 Lockett, on the other hand, declared off-limits any effort to limit the evidence a defendant could present as a defense to
the death penalty so long as the evidence touched upon the defendant's character or the nature of the offense. After all, Ohio had not
prevented the defendant from presenting a case against the imposition of death penalty, but had only tried to limit the defendant's
arguments to factors the state viewed as relevant.4 1 Lockett made
clear that such relevancy determinations were a matter of federal
37. Id. at 604.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 605.
40. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (mandatory death penalty
violates eighth amendment); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976) (same).
41. It is instructive, for instance, to see how the Ohio Supreme Court had reconciled Ohio's statute with Woodson and Roberts:
The General Assembly might properly have included other mitigating
circumstances, or declined to list specific mitigating circumstances, but
we conclude that those which are listed do direct inquiry both to the
circumstances of the crime and to the individual culpability of the defendant, and so adequately guide the decision of the sentencing authority.
It is a delicate legislative task to provide standards which are not arbitrary, yet which allow meaningful consideration of the defendant and his
crime, and it is an essential judicial task to assure that those standards be
strictly construed in favor of the defendant, to allow the broadest consideration of mitigating circumstances consistent with their language.
State v. Bayless, 48 Ohio St. 2d 73, 86, 357 N.E.2d 1035, 1045-46 (1976).
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constitutional law and that the eighth amendment principle of individualized consideration barred the state from determining for the
sentencer which aspects of the offender or the offense justified consideration as mitigating factors.
The Court did have an alternative, advocated in part by Justice
Blackmun in a concurring opinion, to Lockett's wholesale removal
of mitigating circumstances from state control. The opinion could
have narrowly held that the eighth amendment required that the
defendant's degree of participation and mens rea be included on the
state's list of mitigating factors. 42 Under this approach, the Court
presumably would have developed, on a case-by-case basis, a list of
constitutionally required mitigating factors and then left the state
free to augment the core list as they saw fit. This approach, had it
prevailed, essentially would have mirrored the Court's treatment of
aggravating factors by developing a list of Court approved mitigating factors for the states to use. In theory, this approach still could
have led to Lockett's broad definition of what constitutes relevant
mitigating circumstances if the Court kept finding each challenged
factor to be "relevant," but it would have done so on a case-by-case
basis.
The plurality opinion did not expressly explain why it eschewed such a factor-by-factor approach. However, good reasons
existed for its rejection once a majority agreed that "relevant" mitigating circumstances should include all aspects of the defendant
and the offense arguing for a sentence less than death. To have prolonged reaching Lockett's ultimate conclusion through step-by-step
holdings would have sewn further confusion in an already confused
area of the law. Indeed, one of the Court's explicit goals in deciding
Lockett was to clarify the eighth amendment principles governing
capital punishment: "The signals from this Court have not ... always been easy to decipher. The States now deserve the clearest
guidance that the Court can provide; we have an obligation to reconcile previously differing views [from prior cases] in order to provide that guidance. '43 In Gregg, the Court had attempted to
articulate its views on the need to narrow eligibility for the death
42. Cf.'Lockett, 438 U.S. at 613, 615-16 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (advocating
"more limited" rule which would ,"merely require[] that the sentencing authority
be
permitted to weigh any available evidence . . . concerning the defendant's degree of
participation .... and the nature of his mens rea in regard to the commission of the
homicidal act.").
43. Id. at 602.

1160

UCLA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:1147

penalty, and it clearly hoped that through Lockett's holding it was
completing the mitigating half of the circle.
Lockett quickly became a mainstay of the Court's death penalty jurisprudence, and it required the rewriting or judicial modification of state statutes which had limited the mitigating
circumstances that could be raised. The Court applied Lockett to
different contexts in a manner that continually stressed that state
efforts to limit full consideration of mitigating evidence ran afoul of
the eighth amendment. Among its post-Lockett rulings, the Court
invalidated judicial barriers to consideration of mitigating evidence, 44 statutory barriers to consideration of all mitigating evi46
dence, 45 procedural hurdles such as jury unanimity requirements,
and evidentiary restrictions such as temporal limits on whether the
defendant's behavior was relevant mitigating evidence.47 The Court
also reaffirmed its condemnation of mandatory death penalties, even
in the very specific context of an inmate serving a life sentence who
commits a murder.48 The Court's hope that Lockett would stand as
a bedrock eighth amendment principle providing coherence to its
death penalty rulings was evident in these cases.
Lockett and its progeny thus came to stand as a rather formidable barrier to any state efforts to regulate what mitigating evidence a defendant could rely upon in trying to argue for a sentence
less than death. In fact, based on the cases following Lockett, a
persuasive argument could have been made that the mitigating side
of the death penalty balance had been preempted as a matter solely
for federal constitutional law and was completely off-limits to the
states. Such an argument would have proven to be in error, however, for within Lockett's holding was an underlying tension with
44. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 n.10 (1982) (reversing death penalty
because sentencing judge apparently believed defendant's youthfulness and mental disturbance were not permissible mitigating circumstances to consider under state law"We note that the Oklahoma death penalty statute permits the defendant to present
[but] Lockett requires the sentencer
evidence 'as to any mitigating circumstances' ....
to listen.").

45. Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934 (1989) (Texas scheme of posing special questions to sentencer invalid to the extent it precludes sentencer from considering defend-

ant's mental retardation).
46. McKoy v. North Carolina, 110 S. Ct. 1227 (1990); Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S.
367 (1988).
47. Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 (1986) (evidence of defendant's good
behavior after arrest must be admitted as relevant mitigating evidence).
48. Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66 (1987). This was a situation expressly left an
open issue in Lockett. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 n.ll (1978).
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Furman and Gregg that provided a foothold for restraining Lockett
and, perhaps eventually, the means of its own demise.
II.

THE TENSION BETWEEN "INDIVIDUALIZED

CONSIDERATION" AND "GUIDED DISCRETION":
CAN THEY BE RECONCILED?

A.

The Two Stages of the Death Penalty Decision

Even the most ardent supporter of Lockett's holding can muster some sympathy for the Ohio legislature. Reading Furman's
condemnation of unbridled discretion, it identified specific aggravating circumstances on one side of the ledger and specific mitigating
factors on the other side for the sentencer to consider, thinking it
was fulfilling the Court's commands. 49 At least on the surface,
Lockett's immunization of mitigating circumstances against state
regulation appears to conflict with Furman and Gregg's most fundamental premise that a sentencer must not be given unbridled discretion over whether to impose the death penalty. Yet, after
Lockett, one of the surest routes to reversible error would be to
guide the sentencer by listing mitigating factors that could be considered without also making clear that the sentencer could consider
any unlisted mitigating evidence bearing on the offender's
culpability. 50
In Lockett, it was Justice White who most forcibly made the
argument that allowing consideration of all mitigating evidence that
bears on the appropriateness of the death penalty conflicts with
Furman. Justice White complained that "[t]he Court has now completed its about-face since Furman v. Georgia," and expressed the
great[ ] fear that the effect of the Court's decision today will be to
compel constitutionally a restoration of the state of affairs at the
time Furman was decided, where the death penalty is imposed so
erratically and the threat of execution is so attenuated for even
the most atrocious murders that "its imposition would then be
49. See supra note 28. Justice Rehnquist lamented in his Lockett dissent that:
"[Tihe Court has gone from pillar to post, with the result that the sort of reasonable
predictability upon which legislatures, trial courts, and appellate courts must of necessity rely has been all but completely sacrificed." 438 U.S. at 629 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
50. Boyde v. California, 110 S. Ct. 1190 (1990), is not to the contrary. In Boyde,
the defendant challenged a jury instruction on the grounds that it did not adequately
convey to the jury that it was allowed to consider non-statutory mitigating circumstances. Although a majority upheld the instruction, it did so because it found the
instruction adequately conveyed to the jury that it could consider unlisted mitigating
factors, not because such an instruction was unnecessary. Id. at 1197-1201.
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conpointless and needless extinction of life with only marginal
51
tributions to any discernable social or public purposes."
Justice White's opinion must be qualified by two considerations. First, he had voted to uphold mandatory death penalties, and
he made clear in Lockett that he continued to reject the principle of
52
individualized consideration as an eighth amendment value. Second, his fear of a reversion back to a pre-Furman state of affairs
appeared to stem from a concern that sentencers might respond to
the mitigating evidence by "refus[ing] to impose the death penalty
53
no matter what the circumstances of the crime," rather than from
a disagreement that such evidence was relevant if one accepted the
principle of individualized consideration. It was unclear, therefore,
whether Justice White would continue to object if his fear proved to
be unfounded that sentencers would use Lockett to arbitrarily imon "those very few for whom society
pose the death penalty only
'54
has least consideration.
The Court took a number of years before it began to acknowledge and address that a "tension ...has long existed between the
two central principles [of guided discretion and individualized sen'5 5 The Lockett
tencing] of our Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.
plurality itself had not directly responded to Justice White's concerns over arbitrariness, although its justification for a broad definition of relevance-that it enhanced the reliability of the sentencer's
decision-stood in direct contradiction to his concerns. Consequently, it is only in the more recent cases involving Lockett issues
that the Court has begun to address the tension directly.
The Court's basic response has been to conceptualize the death
penalty decision as consisting of two stages. The first stage involves
the decision of whether the defendant is eligible for the death penalty and the second stage focuses on the decision not to impose the
51. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 622-23 (White, J., dissenting in part) (quoting Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 312 (1972) (White, J., concurring) (citations omitted)).
52. Id. (reaffirming adherence to his dissent in Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325,
337 (1976)).
53. Id.
54. Id. Justice Rehnquist dissented in part out of the same concern that "the new
constitutional doctrine will not eliminate arbitrariness or freakishness in the imposition
of sentences, but will codify and institutionalize it." Id. at 631 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
55. California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 544 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring); see
also Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 182 (1988) ("arguably these two lines of cases
... are somewhat in 'tension' with each other."); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279,
363 (1987) (Blackmun, J. dissenting) (observing "there perhaps is an inherent tension").
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death penalty. 56 For the first stage, the eighth amendment focus
will be on whether the state has sufficiently narrowed the class of
defendants who are "death eligible" and whether the sentencer has
been guided adequately in its identification of such defendants. The
second stage says once the narrowing process has taken place, the
sentencer must decide whether or not the defendant should fall out
of the death penalty pool. After Lockett, the sentencer's decision
must be made only after it has considered all mitigating evidence
bearing on the offender and the offense. 57
56. See, e.g., Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934, 2951 (1989); McCleskey, 481 U.S.
at 304 ("In contrast to the carefully defined standards that must narrow a sentencer's
discretion to impose the death sentence, the Constitution limits a State's ability to narrow a sentencer's discretion to consider relevant evidence that might cause it to decline
to impose the death sentence.") (emphasis in original); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862,
878-79 (1983). The two-phase approach actually has its roots in Justice White's Gregg
concurrence in which he rejected the defendant's argument that the Georgia Statute
violated Furman by investing too much discretion in the sentencer:
The Georgia Legislature has plainly made an effort to guide the jury in
the exercise of its discretion, while at the same time permitting the jury to
dispense mercy on the basis of factors too intangible to write into a statute, and I cannot accept the naked assertion that the effort is bound to
fail. As the types of murders for which the death penalty may be imposed become more narrowly defined and are limited to those which are
particularly serious or for which the death penalty is peculiarly appropriate as they are in Georgia by reason of the aggravating-circumstance requirement, it becomes reasonable to expect that juries--even given
discretion not to impose the death penalty-will impose the death penalty
in a substantial portion of the cases so defined. If they do, it can no
longer be said that the penalty is being imposed wantonly and freakishly
or so infrequently that it loses its usefulness as a sentencing device.
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 222 (1976) (White, J., conicurring) (emphasis in original); see also Hertz & Weisberg, In Mitigation of the Penalty of Death: Lockett v. Ohio
and the Capital Defendant's Right to Consideration of Mitigating Circumstances, 69
CAL. L. REV. 317, 374-76 (1981).
57. In Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 (1983), the Court
approvingly'quoted- the
Georgia Supreme Court's conceptualization of the process as a pyramid divided into
three planes:
The first plane of division above the base separates from all homicide
cases those which fall into the category of murder ....
The second plane separates from all murder cases those in which the
penalty of death is a possible punishment. This plane is established by
statutory definitions of aggravating circumstances ....
The third plane separates, from all cases in which a penalty of death
may be imposed, those cases in which it shall be imposed. There is an
absolute discretion in the factfinder to place any given case below the
plane and not impose death. The plane itself is established by the
factfinder.
Id. at 870-72 (quoting Zant v. Stephens, 250 Ga. 97, 99-100, 297 S.E.2d 1, 3-4 (1982)
(citations omitted)).

1164

UCLA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:1147

Splitting the decision-making process into two distinct stages
allows the Court to justify treating aggravating and mitigating factors differently by maintaining that they address distinct aspects of
the sentencer's decision. Furman's concern with unbridled discretion is satisfied through the specification of aggravating circumstances that operate to identify the pool of defendants upon whom
the penalty can be imposed. 58 Once the pool is identified and the
sentencer is faced with the decision of whether "to decline to impose
the death sentence," ' 59 then full consideration of mitigating evidence
must be allowed. This stage enhances reliability by ensuring that
the sentencer has considered all relevant factors pertaining to the
individual's culpability and character before making its "reasoned
moral response." 60 Thus, by dividing the decision process into two
stages, the Court has been able to find that the sentencing process
accommodates the "twin objectives" of guided discretion and indi6
vidualized consideration. '

B. Justice Scalia's Call for Overruling Lockett v. Ohio
Does this explanation resolve the "inherent tension" between
Furman and Lockett? Justice Scalia emphatically has declared that
it does not. He believes that it is impossible to reconcile the notions
of guided discretion and individualized consideration: "To acknowledge that 'there perhaps is an inherent tension,' between [the Lockett] line of cases and the line stemming from Furman ...is rather
like saying that there was perhaps an inherent tension between the
''
Allies and the Axis Powers in World War II. 62 Nor does he believe that the death penalty decision itself can be split into two
dimensions, arguing that, "[tihe decision whether to impose the
death penalty is a unitary one; unguided discretion not to impose is
58. Penry, 109 S. Ct. at 2951; see also Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 198-99
(1988) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (Gregg and Lockett both "guide" by focusing attention
on offender and the offense).
59. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 304 (emphasis in original).
60. Penry, 109 S. Ct. at 2951 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
61. Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 459-60 (1984); see also Franklin,487 U.S. at
182.
62. Walton v. Arizona, 110 S.Ct. 3047, 3063 (1990) (quoting McCleskey, 481 U.S.
(Blackmun, J.,dissenting)). Like Justice Scalia, legal commentators also have
363
at
argued that Furman and Lockett are in conflict, but usually for the very different purpose of illustrating the failure of the Court's entire death penalty jurisprudence, including that built upon Gregg. See generally Radin, Cruel Punishment and Respect for
Persons: Super Due Processfor Death, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 1143, 1153 (1980); Weisberg,
supra note 7.
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unguided discretion to impose as well."' 63 Consequently, for Justice
Scalia, if the sentencer is given unbridled discretion at any point in
the decision-making process, Furman's command of providing a
"governing standard" to the sentencer is violated. 64 Because he
believes that Lockett and Furman are irreconcilable, Justice Scalia declared in his concurring opinion in Walton v. Arizona that he "will
not, in this case or in the future, vote to uphold an Eighth Amendment claim that the sentencer's discretion has been unlawfully
65
restricted."
As with Justice White's dissent in Lockett, Justice Scalia's objection to Lockett did not stem solely from the discretion given the
sentencer through Lockett's broad definition of relevant mitigating
evidence. His objection also extended to the very principle of individualized consideration established in Woodson v. North Carolina 66 and Roberts v. Louisiana,67 the cases finding mandatory
death penalties unconstitutional. Justice Scalia reiterated in abbreviated form the dissenters' position in Woodson and Roberts that
the eighth amendment provided no textual support for rejection of
mandatory death penalties:
[t]he mandatory imposition of death-without sentencing discretion-for a crime which States have traditionally punished with
death cannot possibly violate the Eighth Amendment, because it
will not be 'cruel' (neither absolutely nor for the particular
crime) and it will not be 'unusual' (neither in the sense of being a
63. Penry, 109 S. Ct. at 2968 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
It was in his Penry concurrence that Justice Scalia first noted his dissatisfaction with the
interaction of Furman and Lockett. Id. at 2968-69.
64. Walton, 110 S. Ct. at 3063. Justice Scalia elaborated:
Pursuant to Furman, and in order "to achieve a more rational and equitable administration of the death penalty," we require that States "channel the sentencer's discretion by 'clear and objective standards' that
provide 'specific and detailed guidance.' " In the next breath, however,
we say that "the State cannot channel the sentencer's discretion ... to
consider any relevant [mitigating] information offered by the defendant,"
that the sentencer must enjoy unconstrained discretion to decide whether
any sympathetic factors bearing on the defendant or the crime indicate
that he does not "deserve to be sentenced to death." The latter requirement quite obviously destroys whatever rationality and predictability the
former requirement was designed to achieve.
Id. (citations omitted).
65. Id. at 3068. If the temptation arises to condemn Justice Scalia for refusing to
abide by the majority's rule, fairness requires that one remember that Justices Brennan
and Marshall have steadfastly adhered in every post-Gregg case to their dissenting position in Gregg that the death penalty is per se unconstitutional. See supra note 34.
66. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
67. 428 U.S. 325 (1976).

UCLA LAW REVIEW

1166

[Vol. 38:1147

nor in the sense of being
type of penalty that is not traditional
68
rarely or 'freakishly' imposed).

In advocating this narrower interpretation of "cruel and unusual,"'69 Justice Scalia also discounted as "quite immaterial" the
plurality's reliance in Woodson and Roberts on the historical and
70
legislative trend against mandatory death penalties and their use
of evidence that juries faced with mandatory death penalties frequently disregard their instructions and refuse to return a guilty
71
verdict for the capital offense. As he had with Lockett, Justice
Scalia declared that he no longer would follow Woodson's principle
of individualized consideration, "a principle so lacking in support in
constitutional text and so plainly unworthy of respect under stare
decisis.

' ' 72

In assessing Justice Scalia's call for overruling Woodson and
Lockett, it is important to recognize that, as with Justice White's
68. Walton, 110 S. Ct. at 3067 (Scalia, J., concurring). It was only with reluctance
that Justice Scalia found himself even willing to adhere to Furman. In Walton, he
expressed the opinion that Furman'sinterpretation of the eighth amendment "is probably not what was meant by an 'unusual punishment' in the Eighth Amendment," but
concluded that the Eighth Amendment would "bear" Furman's interpretation. Id. at
3066.
69. Justice Scalia's precise interpretation of the eighth amendment remains to be
developed, as he did not view Walton as the proper occasion to fully explore the issue.
Id. at 3066. His brief analysis suggests that to the extent he accepts Furman's conclusion that "unusualness" includes rarely imposed penalties as well as non-traditional
punishments, his main disagreement with the Woodson Court's interpretation of the
eighth amendment was its willingness to include "contemporary community values"
and "human dignity" as legitimate eighth amendment inquiries. Id. at 3067 (dismissing
such factors as "immaterial" and irrelevant); see also id. at 3090 n.7 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (contending that Justice Scalia overlooks these factors).
70. Id. at 3067.
71. Id. This appears to be the only part of Woodson's analysis that Justice Scalia
thought even arguably proper under the eighth amendment, because it would fall within
Furman's definition of "unusualness" as including the arbitrary imposition of the penalty, see supra note 69. Justice Scalia dismissed the argument, however, because he
believed it "conjecture (found nowhere else in the law) that juries systematically disregard their oaths." Id. at 3067. He also contended that if jury nullification does occur, it
undermines Furman itself, because if juries would not obey instructions under a
mandatory death penalty scheme, there is no reason to believe they would follow the
standards required by Furman in a guided discretionary scheme. Justice White had
made a similar argument in his Roberts dissent. Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 360
(1976) (White, J., dissenting).
The argument, however, fails to recognize that juries were disregarding their oaths
under mandatory schemes because they had no other means of avoiding impositions of
the death penalty for a particular defendant whom the jury did not believe deserved to
die. Woodson and Lockett provide the jury a legal means to channel their individualized consideration, making it much more likely that they will follow the standards given
to them. See also infra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
72. Walton, 110 S. Ct. at 3068.
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dissent in Lockett, two different arguments are being forwarded:
one that individualized consideration is not required by the eighth
amendment and one that it conflicts with Furman. If the first basis
for overruling Lockett is correct, that Woodson erroneously found
that the eighth amendment requires individualized consideration,
then Lockett also falls because its holding that the sentencer must
be allowed to consider all relevant mitigating evidence is premised
on the existence of such a constitutional right. In this sense, Woodson and Lockett are inextricably bound together as constitutional
rulings, and Justice Scalia's packaging of them throughout his opinion as "Woodson-Lockett" is accurate. It is a very different argument, however, to contend that Woodson and Lockett are
unsupportable not because they lack constitutional underpinnings,
but rather because they conflict with a different eighth amendment
command, Furman's condemnation of unbridled discretion. Now
the question becomes whether the eighth amendment principle of
individualized consideration can be implemented without violating
Furman's ban on unbridled discretion. Justice Scalia appeared to
acknowledge the distinction between the argument that Woodson
and Lockett lack a valid constitutional basis and the contention that
Woodson and Lockett cannot be constitutionally implemented:
My initial and my fundamental problem.., is not that Woodson
and Lockett are wrong, but that Woodson and Lockett are rationally irreconcilable with Furman. It is that which led me into the
inquiry whether either they or Furman was wrong. I would not
know how to apply.., both them and Furman-ifI wanted to.
I cannot continue to say, in case after case, what degree of "narrowing" is sufficient to achieve the constitutional objective enunciated in Furman when I know that that objective is in any case
impossible of achievement because of Woodson-Lockett . ...
Stare decisis cannot command the impossible. Since I cannot
possibly be guided by what seem to me incompatible
principles, I
73
must reject the one that is plainly in error.
Under this argument Woodson and Lockett do not necessarily fall
together. One could still find that Lockett's broad treatment of mitigating circumstances violates Furman, but uphold Woodson's more
limited ruling that mandatory death penalties are unconstitutional
because no mitigating evidence may be considered. Because the
constitutional consequences vary depending upon which argument
is used to overrule Lockett-that it lacks a constitutional basis or
that it conflicts with Furman-each argument needs to be addressed separately.
73. Id. at 3067-68.
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1. The Eighth Amendment and the Principle of Individualized
Consideration
The debate over whether the principle of individualized consideration is part of the eighth amendment's ban on "cruel and unusual punishment" need not be revisited in detail. The plurality and
dissenting opinions in Woodson and Roberts admirably developed
the competing viewpoints over whether the eighth amendment recognizes such a principle, and the textual and historical evidence underlying those opinions has not changed. 74 Any overruling of
Woodson, therefore, could not be justified on the basis that the intervening fifteen years has yielded new evidence for the debate, but
must rest solely on the current Court adopting a different interpre75
tation of the same evidence and policy considerations. If "the fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment"
74. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Roberts, 428 U.S. 325.
The Woodson plurality based its decision on three factors. First, the plurality found
that mandatory death penalties violated contemporary standards of decency. As evidence of this, Justice Stewart pointed to the legislative trend rejecting mandatory
schemes and the not infrequent refusal of juries to convict defendants of capital crimes
where death was the automatic penalty. The dissent, on the other hand, argued that the
legislative movement towards discretionary schemes and the "actions of some maverick
juries or jurors" were far too ambiguous to serve as evidence that society had rejected
mandatory death penalties as violating standards of decency. Woodson, 428 U.S. at
309-13 (Rehnquist, J. dissenting). The dissent also argued that the large number of
states adopting mandatory death penalties after Furman showed continued acceptance
of the principle. Id. at 313. The plurality had dismissed those statutes as being enacted
because of a belief that mandatory schemes were the only way to satisfy Furman. Id. at
289-300.
The plurality's second argument was that given the problem of jury nullification in
mandatory schemes, "a mandatory scheme may well exacerbate the problem [of arbitrary and capricious death penalties] identified in Furman, by resting the penalty determination on the particular jury's willingness to act lawlessly." Id. at 303. The dissent's
response primarily was to argue that if jury discretion was unobjectionable in statutes
like the ones approved in Gregg and Proffit, exercise of jury discretion through nullification would be no more objectionable. Id. at 314-16 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Nor
did the dissent agree with the plurality's argument that a formalized discretionary system would make death penalty decisions more readily reviewable on appeal, because
juries still did not have to specify the mitigating factors upon which they relied. Id. at
317-19 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
The plurality's final reason was its more direct and independent determination that
given the unique nature of the death penalty, "the fundamental respect for humanity
underlying the Eighth Amendment" required individualized consideration. Id. at
303-05. The dissent objected that the plurality was "surrender[ing] to the temptation
to make policy for and to attempt to govern the country through a misuse of the powers
given this Court under the Constitution." Roberts, 428 U.S. at 363 (White, J.,
dissenting).
75. The Woodson plurality's finding was that societal standards had "evolved" to
reject mandatory penalties. 428 U.S. at 288-301. Thus, any new evidence would have
to show society has "devolved" in its standards. One can only imagine how the Court
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and the historical experience with mandatory death penalties required individualized consideration for capital cases in 1976,76 the
only reason that the amendment does not also require it in 1991 or
later is that a majority of Supreme Court justices now hold a different view of what constitutes human dignity under the eighth
amendment.
How far the Court can go in interpreting provisions of the Bill
of Rights such as the ban on cruel and unusual punishment is, of
course, at the center of the ongoing and heated debate over the
Court's proper role in interpreting the Constitution and Bill of
Rights."7 Justice Scalia very well might embrace an explanation
that the Court's view of human dignity under the eighth amendment has changed, in the sense that the Court no longer is willing to
read into the phrase "cruel and unusual" its own views of human
dignity. 78 The important point for this discussion is that if Woodson and its principle of individualized consideration are overruled,
the Court's action would not be based on changes in contemporary
values or jury behavior, factors relied upon in Woodson, but rather
would reflect a change in the Court's sentiment towards a principle
that has been a central tenet of the eighth amendment for fifteen
years.
In arguing for overruling Woodson and Lockett, Justice Scalia
was not completely insensitive to the issue of stare decisis. He maintained, however, that the cases had "frustrated [stare decisis'] very
purpose [of introducing certainty and stability into the law] from
the outset-contradicting the basic thrust of much of our death
penalty jurisprudence, laying traps for unwary States, and generating a fundamental uncertainty in the law that shows no signs of
would phrase such a determination: "Because society's standards of decency have now
lessened to a sufficient degree..."
76. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304.
77. Although Furman itself involved a closely fought battle over the Court's role in
interpreting the eighth amendment, see supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text, Justice White saw the Court's role in Woodson and Roberts as distinguishable. In Furman,
Justice White was on the "activist" side of the debate, finding the Court could use the
eighth amendment to prevent the states from imposing the death penalty so infrequently
and randomly that it no longer served legitimate penological purposes. Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 312-14 (1972) (White J., concurring). But in Woodson and
Roberts, he argued that the Court no longer was simply assessing whether the state
procedures produced arbitrary results, but was actively dictating procedures to be followed. Roberts, 428 U.S. at 356-58 (White, J., dissenting).
78. See generally R. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 219-21 (1990) (criticizing Justice Brennan's argument that the
eighth amendment protects "human dignity").

1170

UCLA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:1147

ending or even diminishing. ' 79 Consequently, Justice Scalia cleverly argued that overruling the cases would in fact promote certainty in the law and further the values of stare decisis rather than
undermine them.
Justice Scalia may be correct about the future uncertainty over
Woodson-Lockett issues, 80 but eliminating the principle of individualized consideration may not create any greater certainty.
Although Woodson -Lockett issues would be foreclosed,"' overruling
the cases would create a constitutional acceptance of mandatory
death penalties and schemes severely restricting mitigating factors,
which are likely to create a whole new set of constitutional head82
aches if states enact them.
The history of the mandatory death penalty is that of the sentencer seeking a means to evade the law's mandate. By definition, a
mandatory death penalty requires that the state be able to define in
advance a set of circumstances that always will justify imposition of
the death penalty. Although in the abstract it may seem possible to
factually describe circumstances where the death penalty is always
79. Walton v. Arizona, 110 S. Ct. 3047, 3068 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia has expressed an unwillingness to be bound too greatly by stare decisis, especially where the decision is of recent vintage. See South Carolina v. Gathers, 109 S. Ct.
2207, 2218 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Powell, supra note 9, at 287-88 (discussing
recent challenges to the doctrine of stare decisis). The intensity of Justice Scalia's attack
on Woodson and Lockett may in part be explained by the fact that those cases have
become sufficiently embedded so that "state and federal laws and practices have been
adjusted to embody [them]." Gathers, 109 S. Ct. at 2218. Justice Scalia's criticism of
Woodson and Lockett for creating legal uncertainty is consistent with his stated concern
that the law be predictable. See Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1175, 1179-80 (1989).
80. In the 1989-90 term the Court attempted to resolve a number of Lockett issues
regarding state procedures for instructing juries on how to use mitigating evidence.
Whether these rulings will decrease the uncertainty is a questionable proposition: See
infra notes 175-196 and accompanying text.
81. However, if the Court overrules the cases on the ground that unguided mitigation violates Furman, then the Court may be faced with new 'reverse Lockett' issues of
whether sentencer consideration of mitigating evidence is adequately controlled, see infra notes 134-143 and accompanying text.
82. If the Court overrules Woodson and Lockett not solely on the grounds that they
do not properly interpret the eighth amendment, but also on the basis that they produce
arbitrary results, then the only constitutional death penalty may be a mandatory one,
see infra notes 99-100 and accompanying text. Assuming the Court simply finds that
mandatory death penalties are permissible and not required, how many states in fact
enact mandatory death penalties would help shed light on the disagreement in Woodson
over whether the states passing mandatory schemes after Furman did so because they
believed such schemes were the only way to satisfy Furman or because they voluntarily
chose the mandatory death penalty, see supra note 74.
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justified, historically this task has proven impossible.8 3 Whether
through the development of legal escape routes, like the benefit of
clergy in England, 84 or through the refusal of the sentencer to follow the law, discretion has inevitably crept into mandatory death
penalty schemes and created fissures of uncertainty within the legal
framework.
Two fissures of uncertainty in particular are likely to appear in
a post-Furman mandatory death penalty scheme. The greatest constitutional stress point would be the Court's eighth amendment disproportionality analysis, which requires the Court to determine
whether the death penalty is proportional and penologically justified when applied to the defendant and his offense.85 The Court
already has confronted a number of difficult disproportionality challenges involving the death penalty for rapists, juveniles, mentally
retarded individuals and non-triggermen convicted of felony-murder. 86 When the Court has rejected a disproportionality challenge,
it often has relied on the fact that the challenged factor can be considered in mitigation by the sentencer. For example, Justice Scalia
in upholding the death penalty for sixteen and seventeen year-old
offenders relied on the fact that the jury could take the offender's
83. See generally Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 289-93 (1976) (tracing history of mandatory death penalty in United States and concluding, "[t]he history
of mandatory death penalty statutes in the United States thus reveals that the practice
of sentencing to death all persons convicted of a particular offense has been rejected as
unduly harsh and unworkably rigid."); Poulous, supra note 17, at 146-58.
84. The benefit of clergy is a wonderful case study of how cracks of discretion
inevitably open up within supposedly mandatory schemes. The benefit originally was
used in medieval England as a means of ensuring that clergy accused of crimes were
tried by the ecclesiastical rather than secular courts. Ecclesiastical courts, unlike secular courts, could not render a "judgment of blood," that is, impose the death penalty.
The availability of the benefit of clergy gradually was expanded from the clergy to anyone who could pass a simple literacy test. Because the test always used the same bible
verse, the 51st Psalm, the benefit was often extended on the basis of memorization
rather than literacy. Much of the history of the death penalty in England is a tug-ofwar over the scope of the benefit of clergy. See generally G. DALZELL, BENEFIT OF
CLERGY IN AMERICA & RELATED MATTERS 20 (1955);

L. GABEL, BENEFIT OF

CLERGY IN ENGLAND IN THE LATER MIDDLE AGEs 7 (1969); 1 J. STEPHEN, A HIsTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 461 (1883).
85. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173, 182-87 (1976) (plurality opinion).
86. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 109 S.Ct. 2969 (1989) (death penalty not disproportionate for 16 and 17 year olds); Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934 (1989) (death penalty not per se disproportionate for mentally retarded defendants); Tison v. Arizona,
481 U.S. 137 (1987) (death penalty not disproportionate for non-triggerman who is major participant and shows reckless indifference to human life); Enmund v. Florida, 458
U.S. 782 (1982) (death penalty disproportionate for non-triggerman who does not intend to kill); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (death penalty disproportionate for
rape).
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youth into consideration, because, as he quoted Lockett, "individualized consideration [is] a constitutional requirement."8' 7 Would the
Court still find the death penalty for juveniles or mentally retarded
individuals to be proportional if the sentencer were legally barred
from taking such factors into account? Or would the Court be
forced to develop two lines of disproportionality analysis, one for
discretionary statutes and another for mandatory schemes?
One can only speculate (which, in part, is the point) how the
Court would alter its disproportionality analysis to accommodate
the pressures created by a mandatory death penalty. The Court's
reliance on sentencer discretion to justify its current disproportionality analysis does suggest, however, that even with a mandatory
death penalty the principle of individualized consideration eventually would surface in one form or other.
Moreover, such problems would not be confined to mandatory
death penalties, but could apply to any scheme where the disputed
factor is not recognized by the state as a valid mitigating circumstance. It is highly instructive that of the three Justices in Lockett
who rejected the plurality's principle of individualized consideration, two-Justices White and Blackmun-still would have found
Ohio's death penalty statute with its limited mitigating factors unconstitutional as applied to Lockett. Justice White would have reversed because he believed the death penalty for a non-triggerperson
who did not intend to kill was so disproportionate that it violated
the eighth amendment.8 8 Justice Blackmun, on the other hand, rejected Justice White's disproportionality approach as too likely to
create constitutional confusion,8 9 and advocated reversal through
87. Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2978. Justice Scalia was even more direct in Thompson
v. Oklahoma, arguing that Lockett changed his disproportionality analysis when applied

to death sentences for 15 year-old offenders:
If the issue before us today were whether an automatic death penalty for
conviction of certain crimes could be extended to individuals younger
than 16 when they commit the crimes, thereby preventing individualized
consideration of their maturity and moral responsibility, I would accept
the plurality's conclusion that such a practice is opposed by a national
consensus, sufficiently uniform and of sufficiently long standing, to render
it cruel and unusual punishment within the meaning of the Eighth
Amendment. We have already decided as much, and more, in Lockett v.
Ohio.

Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 859 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Penry,

109 S. Ct. at 2958 ("[s]o long as sentencers can consider and give effect to mitigating
evidence of mental retardation.., an individualized determination of whether 'death is
the appropriate punishment' can be made in each particular case.").
88. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 624-28 (1978) (White, J., dissenting).
89. Id. at 613-16 & n.2 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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"[t]he more manageable alternative" of what amounted to a very
limited Lockett rule. The inability of Justices White and Blackmun
to agree on an alternative theory to individualized consideration for
reversal, despite their shared finding of unconstitutionality, leaves
one less than sanguine that overruling Woodson and Lockett would
bring harmony to the eighth amendment.
The second likely fissure of uncertainty that would be created
by capital sentencing schemes eliminating or severely limiting sentencer consideration of mitigating evidence stems from the historical lesson that sentencers faced with such schemes will refuse to
follow the law. 90 Woodson's detractors have suggested that jury
nullification is but one form of sentencer discretion and, therefore, if
discretion is permissible under Gregg no basis for objection to jury
nullification exists. 91 That argument, however, completely fails to
distinguish between discretion exercised through lawful channels
and renegade discretion.
Woodson and Lockett directly acknowledge the need for discretion and incorporate it into the internal decision-making process
of the sentencer, allowing the sentencer to directly address the relevant evidence. Sentencer nullification, in contrast, requires the sentencer to exercise discretion within the larger context of deciding
whether to disobey the law-renegade discretion. Forcing the sentencer to exercise discretion by deciding whether or not to operate
within the confines of the law adds a wild card aspect to the sentencer's decision that is much more likely to produce arbitrary and
capricious results. Like-situated defendants may be treated differently not because the sentencers differ over whether the evidence
justifies death, but because the sentencers differ over whether they
can depart from the legal standards.
If history repeats itself and sentencer nullification surfaces,
such an occurrence would present serious constitutional problems
90. Although Justice Scalia dismissed the problem of jury nullification as "conjecture," Walton v. Arizona, 110 S. Ct. 3047, 3067 (1990), almost every study of
mandatory death penalty schemes has arrived at the conclusion that jury nullification
was a significant problem. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. at 280, 294 n.29
(reviewing literature and studies documenting problem of jury nullification in capital
cases). See generally THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA: AN ANTHOLOGY 27 (H.
Bedau 1st ed. 1964); T. SELLIN, THE DEATH PENALTY, A REPORT FOR THE MODEL
PENAL CODE PROJECT OF THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE 13 (1959), cited in Woodson, 428 U.S. at 294 n.29; Mackey, The Inutility of Mandatory CapitalPunishment: An
Historical Note, 54 B.U.L. REV. 32 (1974). But cf. Poulos, supra note 17 at 148-51
(concluding jury nullification explanation for movement to unfettered discretion
schemes "overly simplistic").
91. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 314-16 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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under Furman. Forcing the sentencer to make the renegade decision not to obey its legal instructions is not really any different in
kind from the standardless discretion condemned in Furman. In
both cases the sentencer operates without legal standards in deciding whether to impose the death penalty. The situation is arguably
even more arbitrary, however, when the lack of standards arises because the sentencer is forced to defy the law, because now part of
the sentencer's decision involves deciding whether to defy the legal
standards themselves.
Nor, as has been argued, 92 does sentencer nullification under
mandatory schemes mean sentencers are just as likely to disobey the
channelled discretion of statutes like those approved in Gregg and
its companion cases. The essence of such statutes is to narrow who
is factually eligible for the death penalty while still providing a legal
avenue for the sentencer to give voice to the principle of individualized consideration. Consequently, sentencers will be much less inclined to feel compelled to step outside the procedures that are
provided. Thus, while one of Justice Scalia's goals in overruling
Woodson and Lockett may be to bring stability to the law, allowing
the elimination or severe curtailment of sentencer discretion would
simply be to chase the principle of individualized consideration
down one hole and watch it later come up another.
2.

Woodson-Lockett and the Ban on Unbridled Discretion

The second way to argue for overruling Woodson and Lockett
is to maintain that their requirement of individualized consideration
conflicts with Furman'sconstitutional command against unbridled
discretion that produces an arbitrary and capricious imposition of
the death penalty. This is a high stakes argument for both sides of
the death penalty debate because of the possible consequences if the
Court should find that the two principles are at total odds with each
other.
For death penalty advocates, the difficulty is that if the two
principles are of equal constitutional magnitude and truly cannot be
reconciled, then the death penalty itself must be unconstitutional.
The death penalty would be invalid not because it is per se cruel and
unusual, but because it cannot be procedurally implemented in a
constitutional fashion. For if Woodson -Lockett's principle of individualized consideration requires broad discretion, but its effect is to
92. Walton, 110 S. Ct. at 3067 (Scalia, J., concurring); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428
U.S. 325, 360 (1976) (White, J., dissenting).,
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give the sentencer unbridled discretion in violation of Furman, the
death penalty becomes checkmated by the two competing constitu93
tional principles.
On the other hand, death penalty opponents run the risk that
by arguing that the current system's discretion still produces arbitrary and capricious results, the Court's response will not be an invalidation of the death penalty but a reversal of Woodson and
Lockett. Such a course of action would produce the rather unseemly appearance of the Court overruling a constitutional doctrine
of fifteen years because its ultimate price-invalidation of capital
punishment-is too high. 94 Yet, the Court conceivably could hold
that Woodson and Lockett are either of lesser constitutional magnitude than Furman or of no constitutional stature at all. 95 Casting
Furman and Woodson-Lockett as being in total conflict thus poses
the danger that either side advocating such a conclusion may win
the battle but lose the war.
Before addressing whether Furman-Gregg and Woodson -Lockett are intolerably in conflict, two initial observations must be made.
First, if the two lines of cases are irreconcilable, it is not because
their goals are in conflict, but rather because they cannot coherently
be implemented together. The Lockett dissidents paint a picture of
discord by stressing that Furman states that the key to the eighth
amendment is adequately controlling discretion and yet Lockett
takes away the states' ability to guide the sentencer on which mitigating factors to weigh. This facile contrasting of "controlled" and
"open-ended" discretion, however, fails to appreciate that both lines
93. Cf. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 314-19 (1987) (acceptance of peti-

tioner's claim that sentencer discretion is being used in racially discriminatory fashion
might mean that no constitutional death penalty scheme could exist); Gregg v. Georgia,
428 U.S. 153, 225-26 (1976) (White, J., concurring) (dismissing defendant's argument
that too much discretion remains in Georgia system as really an argument that a constitutional death penalty statute cannot be passed). See generally Geimer & Amsterdam,
Why Jurors Vote Life or Death: Operative Factors in Ten Florida Death Penalty Cases,
15 AM. J. CRiM. LAW 1, 53-54 (1987/1988) (arguing their finding that jurors do not
follow statutory guidelines for imposing death penalty means Furman is not being satisfied and yet Woodson precludes alternative of mandatory death penalty).
94. Given the petitioner's strong statistical showing in McCleskey v. Kemp of racial
discrimination based on the race of the victim, a persuasive case can be made that it was
precisely because of the consequences--possible invalidation of all capital punishment
schemes- that the Court refused to find that the defendant had proven that racial discrimination infected the death penalty decision. See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 367 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The Court's decision appears to be based on a fear that the
acceptance of McCleskey's claim would sound the death knell for capital punishment in
Georgia.").
95. See supra notes 74-79 and accompanying text.
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of cases are aimed at the same narrowing objective of identifying, as
precisely as possible, who is within the state's power to execute.
Furman and Gregg pare the pool from one direction by using the
egregiousness of the offense to limit the types of offenses a state may
use to qualify the defendant for the death penalty, while Woodson
and Lockett further narrow the pool by constraining the state's ability to keep the sentencer from considering the defendant's individual culpability for the offense. In this sense, Furman, Gregg,
Woodson and Lockett actually are complementary cases working
towards the same end of identifying the group of defendants most
deserving of death such that its imposition is not cruel and unusual
96
punishment.
It is important to note the common purpose of Furman-Gregg
and Woodson -Lockett at the outset, because it is easy to lose sight of
their shared goal once the focus is turned on the sentencer's role. It
is not until the implementation stage that the two lines of cases begin to part: Furman-Gregg narrow by restricting sentencer discretion, while Woodson -Lockett refine by expanding the sentencer's
evidence base. Of course, whether the two principles can be consistently implemented is a legitimate and crucial inquiry. However,
when the inquiry is undertaken, it should be done with the understanding that the cases are aimed at the same goal. This understanding is easily lost if one focuses only on Justice Scalia's
powerful rhetorical portrayal of the two lines of cases as
97
irreconcilable.
The second observation to bear in mind is that Furman'squarrel was not with all sentencer discretion, but only with discretion
that yielded arbitrary and capricious death penalties.9 8 To simply
point out that a particular case or principle requires broad sentencer
discretion does not by itself invoke Furman'scondemnation. The
critical question, therefore, is whether the discretion Woodson and
96. See Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 198-99 (1988) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(consideration of all mitigating evidence furthers Gregg's goal of guiding discretion by
focusing sentencer on the offender and the offense).
97. A similar glossing over may occur if we simply stop at Justice Scalia's statement that the "individualized determination is a unitary one... does the defendant
deserve death for this crime?" Walton v. Arizona, 110 S. Ct. 3047, 3064 (1990) (Scalia,
J., concurring). Just because the ultimate question requires a yes or no decision does
not mean that the determination itself does not have several dimensions. FurmanGregg and Woodson-Lockett are intended to ensure the sentencer has an opportunity to
consider all facets of the decision.
98. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976) ("Furman mandates that where
discretion is afforded ... that discretion must be suitably directed and limited so as to
minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action.").
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Lockett require to further individualized consideration results in the
freakish imposition of the death penalty.
With these two observations in mind, the examination of
whether and to what degree, the Furman-Gregg and WoodsonLockett lines of cases are in conflict can proceed. It is easiest to
start with the 'total conflict' view and ask whether the Lockett dissidents truly believe that sentencer discretion to consider the individual circumstances of the defendant is totally irreconcilable with
Furman'scommands. One way to test the total conflict position is
to ask what would be a valid death penalty scheme if the proposition is adopted. If giving the sentencer discretion to consider the
particular offender and the circumstances of the offense by itself
truly undermines Furman's command, then the answer must be
that the only valid death penalty would be a mandatory death penalty that takes all discretion from the sentencer. 99 Such a conclusion not only would mean that Woodson and Lockett were wrong in
requiring individualized consideration, but that Gregg also was
wrong in allowing any discretion to be given the sentencer.
Neither Justice Scalia nor the Lockett dissenters appear to advocate the extreme position that only mandatory death penalties are
constitutional, but rather object to a constitutional requirement
"that the sentencer must enjoy unconstrained discretion to decide
whether any sympathetic factors bearing on the defendant or the
crime indicate that he does not 'deserve to be sentenced to
death.' "100 The difference in objection is extremely important, because it is a concession that individualized consideration does not
always conflict with Furman; otherwise, the only constitutional
death penalty would be a mandatory one. As a result, the problem
no longer is a choice between the different sides of a dichotomy-no
discretion versus individualized consideration-but an issue of
where on a continuum the principles come into conflict. To that
extent, this issue is not a "Woodson -Lockett" one, but solely a
Lockett issue, because the real complaint is not that all individualized consideration conflicts with Furman, but that Lockett extended
the principle so far that now a conflict arises.
99. Such was the understanding of a majority of the states passing death penalty
statutes after Furman. See Poulous, supra note 17 at 180-92.
100. Walton, I10 S. Ct. at 3063 (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis added) (quoting
Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 2950 (1989)). Justices White and Rehnquist, while
dissenting in Lockett, both concurred in Gregg's upholding of Georgia's discretionary
statute.
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Once the issue is recognized as a question of degree rather than
an all-or-nothing choice, the inquiry can be refined to whether
Lockett's broad definition of relevance does inevitably result, as
Justice Scalia claims, in "random mitigation" and a reversion to
freakish results. 10 1 As a starting point, it is helpful to distinguish
between two potential types of arbitrary and capricious results. The
first type occurs where the sentencer bases its decision on truly random factors not rationally bearing on whether the defendant deserves death; for example, if the sentencer decides not to impose the
death penalty because of the race of the victim, the defendant's societal status, a flip of the coin, or whether the sky is blue, then
Furman undeniably is violated.
To the extent such results occur,' 0 2 however, the blame cannot
be placed directly on Lockett's definition of relevant mitigating evidence. Although broad, the definition is not in and of itself arbitrary and capricious, but is directly tied to the ultimate issue of
whether the defendant deserves the death penalty. 103 Certainly, no
reasonable person would argue that invidious factors like race or
poverty, let alone truly random factors like coin flips or the
weather, properly bear on whether the defendant deserves death.
A reply might be made that although Lockett's definition is
not arbitrary, the breadth of its standard invites decisions to be
made on such factors in a way that a more limited definition of
mitigation would not.104 Empirically proving or disproving such a
proposition obviously is difficult if not impossible. Still, one suspects that if sentencers do rely on invidious or random criteria, such
factors will enter into the decision if the sentencer is given any discretion. At some point the sentencer will have to weigh competing
factors and come to a judgment and, if the sentencer is inclined to
101. Id. at 3064.
102. Cf. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (rejecting petitioner's statistics as
not adequately proving sentencer's decision influenced by race of victim).
103. See Gillers, Deciding Who Dies, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 29-30 (1980) (decision
based on "relevant" mitigating factor under Lockett is by definition not arbitrary because factor will supply rational basis for not imposing death penalty).
104. See Radin, supra note 62, at 1153 ("[b]y requiring more individualization in
capital murder cases after Lockett the Court has necessarily increased the area of possible arbitrariness"); Special Project, Capital Punishment in 1984: Abandoning the Pursuit
of Fairnessand Consistency, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 1129, 1160-63 (1984) [hereinafter

Special Project] (noting possibility that sentencer might disguise "racial motivations" by
pointing to defendant's mitigating factors).
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discriminate or act randomly, the opportunity will exist.l0 5 Short of
banning all sentencer discretion, which may lead to its own randomness through jury nullification, curtailing Lockett's scope
would not cure any truly random or invidious use of mitigating factors. Indeed, arguably the most effective remedy would be not to
limit the sentencer's consideration of mitigating evidence, but to require the state to define more narrowly who becomes death

eligible. 106
A second type of arbitrariness, and the strongest basis for
claiming that Lockett itself produces arbitrary and capricious results, occurs if the standard is so loose that sentencers will not consistently agree on what factors justify a sentence of death. Here, the
argument is that Furman is violated not because juries are acting
irrationally, but because they are reaching inconsistent results. For
example, some juries might find that the defendant's troubled childhood mitigates his responsibility, while others would dismiss it as
an extenuating factor. In other words, so many factors exist over
which people could disagree on whether they call for a sentence less
than death-age, upbringing, drug addiction, intelligence, and so
on-that the results will be arbitrary and capricious. 0 7 In contrast,
the argument would proceed, if states were empowered to specify
which mitigating factors are relevant, then all sentencers, at least
105. See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 317-18 & nn.40-44 (citing studies suggesting that
juries in criminal cases may be influenced by factors such as victim and defendant's
attractiveness).
106. Id. at 367 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (limiting death penalty to "extremely serious
crimes" would significantly decrease discriminatory imposition of death penalty). But
see id. at 318 n.45 (majority opinion) (arguing impracticability of adequately identifying
such categories of cases).
107. Justice Scalia sardonically described the problem as follows:
It would misdescribe the sweep of this principle to say that "all mitigating evidence" must be considered by the sentencer. That would assume
some objective criterion of what is mitigating, which is precisely what we
have forbidden. Our cases proudly announce that the Constitution effectively prohibits the States from excluding from the sentencing decision
any aspect of a defendant's character or record, or any circumstance surrounding the crime: that the defendant had a poor and deprived childhood, or that he had a rich and spoiled childhood; that he had a great
love for the victim's race, or that he had a pathological hatred for the
victim's race; that he has limited mental capacity, or that he has a brilliant mind which can make a great contribution to society; that he was
kind to his mother, or that he despised his mother. Whatever evidence
bearing on the crime or the criminal the defense wishes to introduce as
rendering the defendant less deserving of the death penalty must be admitted into evidence and considered by the sentencer.
Walton v. Arizona, 110 S. Ct. 3047, 3062 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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within that state, would be using the same standards for the individ08
ualized sentencing.1
In the abstract, significant disagreement probably does exist as
°9
to whether any particular factor mitigates and to what extent."
The inquiry cannot end there, however, because sentencers are not
asked to evaluate the mitigating factors abstractly, but are required
by Lockett to apply the mitigating factors to the specific facts and
decide whether the proffered mitigating factors call for a sentence
less than death. The crucial inquiry, therefore, is whether
sentencers diverge so greatly in making their total assessment of
whether a defendant deserves to die that the results are freakish and
arbitrary. Again, it is important to remember that Furman did not
condemn discretion in and of itself, but discretion that produced
arbitrary and capricious results.
The difficulty with determining whether the sentencer can be
trusted to weigh the mitigating evidence in a rational and consistent
fashion is that finding and weighing mitigating factors is generally
unlike other responsibilities we entrust to the trier of fact. Normally, the criminal law tries to define its substance in terms of historical fact: did the defendant do the act? did he intend its
consequences? Even the aggravating factors used to determine who
is "death eligible" are usually cast as historical fact determinations,
such as whether the death occurred in the course of a felonymurder. 110
Mitigating factors, on the other hand, even "historical facts"
like the defendant's youth, ultimately require the sentencer to provide them substance by determining their qualitative importance.
This part of the decision-making process is the "moral" aspect to
which Justice O'Connor referred when she described the death penalty decision as a "reasoned moral" decision."' The elusiveness of
108. Cf. id. at 3064 ("The issue is whether, in the process of the individualized sentencing determination, the society may specify which factors are relevant, and which are
not-whether it may insist upon a rational scheme in which all sentencers making the
individualized determinations apply the same standard.").
109. The disagreement also illustrates, however, the difficulty of compiling a list of

mitigating factors that adequately anticipates in advance the variety of factual settings
that will arise.
110. Not surprisingly, the aggravating factor that has given the Court the most
trouble is the "especially heinous" factor. Like mitigating evidence, the factor has the

potential to be understood differently by different sentencers. See generally Maynard v.
Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 358-59 (1988) (Oklahoma "especially heinous" factor not
adequately defined).
111. California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring). For
further discussion, see infra notes 169-174 and accompanying text.
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such factors in terms of traditional legal definition also helps explain why the Lockett Court opted for a definition of relevance that
drew its meaning directly from the ultimate issue to be decided by
the sentencer-whether or not to impose death-rather than attempting to identify in advance which specific factors were relevant
to the decision.
Can sentencers make such a "reasoned moral" judgment without yielding arbitrary and capricious results? Justice Scalia has rejected the argument outright:
The Court today demands . . .a scheme that simply dumps
before the jury all sympathetic factors bearing upon the defendant's background and character, and the circumstances of the offense, so that the jury may decide without further guidance
whether he 'lacked the moral culpability to be sentenced to
death, did not deserve to be sentenced to death, or was not sufficiently culpable to deserve the death penalty.' The Court seeks
to dignify this by calling it a process that calls for a 'reasoned
moral response,'-but reason has nothing to do with it, the
Court having eliminated the structure that required reason. It is
an unguided, emotional 'moral response' that the Court demands
to be allowed-an outpouring of personal reaction to all the circumstances of a defendant's life and personality, an unfocused
sympathy. 112
Justice Scalia concluded that " '[fjreakishly' and 'wantonly' have
been rebaptized 'reasoned moral response'."' 1 3
Despite Justice Scalia's strong language, the question remains
why one should accept his conclusion rather than the Lockett plurality's opposite conclusion that expanding mitigating evidence
112. Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934, 2968 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (citations omitted). Despite Justice Scalia's characterization, the
Court has stopped far short of embracing a view of Lockett that allows "emotional" or
"compassionate" responses by the sentencer to be considered. See infra
notes 169-174
and accompanying text (discussing Court's approval of anti-sympathy instructions to
jury at capital sentencing hearing).
113. Penry, 109 S. Ct. at 2969 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation omitted); see also
Justice Rehnquist's prediction in his Lockett dissent:
If a defendant as a matter of constitutional law is to be permitted to offer
as evidence in the sentencing hearing any fact, however bizarre, which he
wishes, even though the most sympathetically disposed trial judge could
conceive of no basis upon which the jury might take it into account in
imposing a sentence, the new constitutional doctrine will not eliminate
arbitrariness or freakishness in the imposition of sentences but will codify
and institutionalize it. By encouraging defendants in capital cases, and
presumably sentencing judges and juries, to take into consideration anything under the sun as a 'mitigating circumstance,' it will not guide sentencing discretion but will totally unleash it.
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 631 (1978).

1182

1UCLA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:1147

would enhance reliability. In trying to overturn a settled constitutional principle on the grounds that it fosters arbitrariness, some
evidence ought to exist that sentencers are in fact applying Lockett
evidence in a random and inconsistent fashion. Indeed, if the Court
in McCleskey required the defendant to produce "exceptionally
clear proof before [it] would infer that the discretion has been
14
abused" in a discriminatory fashion,' no reason exists why a similarly high standard should not apply to those challenging the sentencer's use of discretion under Lockett.
Empirical analysis of the proposition is an admittedly difficult
task. 11 5 Substantial evidence exists that the death penalty is not being applied evenhandedly, but the inconsistency appears to be entering through a variety of portals, such as the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion, inadequately defined aggravating circumstances, vague sentencing instructions, the lack of meaningful appellate proportionality review, sentencers' racial attitudes and the
6
quality of defense representation."I The combined inconsistency
emanating from these sources ultimately may require invalidation
of the death penalty as arbitrary, but the crux of the issue here is
why single out Lockett as the culprit and simply assume that it is an
114. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 297 (1987).
115. For an excellent general discussion of the Court's use of empirical findings in
constitutional decisionmaking, see Faigman, "Normative ConstitutionalFact-Finding":
Exploring the Empirical Component of Constitutional Interpretation, 139 U. PA. L.
REV. 541 (1991). One method for determining what mitigating factors influence
sentencers would be to interview sentencers who declined to impose a death sentence.
Cf. Geimer & Amsterdam, supra note 93, at 27-39. A study funded by the National
Science Foundation currently is being undertaken to interview jurors who have served
on capital juries to determine what influenced their decision of whether or not to impose
the death penalty. The author is the director of the California segment of the study.
Some comparative data regarding the frequency of death sentences under Lockett
and non-Lockett schemes would also be informative and might be obtained from a comparison of the various death penalty schemes in operation for the six year period between Furman and when the Court struck down limitations on mitigating evidence in
Lockett. A more recent case study might focus on the Texas death penalty scheme and
whether the Court's ruling in Penry, 109 S. Ct. 2934, which required a broader consideration of mitigating evidence than previously allowed, has resulted in a significant
change in death penalty rates.
116. See generally, R. HOOD, THE DEATH PENALTY: A WORLD-WIDE PERSPECTIVE 98-113 (1989) (surveying studies which look at the consistency of how the American death penalty is being applied); Zeisel, Race Bias in the Administration of the Death
Penalty: The Florida Experience, 95 HARV. L. REV. 456, 466-68 (1981) (focusing on
prosecutorial discretion as the source of racial bias); Baldus, Pulaski, Woodworth &
Kyle, Identifying Comparatively Excessive Sentences of Death: A QuantitativeApproach,
33 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1980) (arguing the need for more rigorous appellate proportionality review to guard against arbitrariness).
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inability to process mitigating evidence which is the source of
Furman violations.
Granted, Lockett expanded the scope of mitigating evidence
that may be presented, but Lockett's standard of relevance-evidence calling for a sentence less than death-standing alone is not
irrational, and no proof exists to justify a conclusion that sentencers
are reacting to "bizarre" evidence and reaching wildly divergent
conclusions. Justice Scalia may be able to list mitigating factors
that do not sound persuasive or consistent standing alone,'IT but
that does not account for how the factors fit into the entire package
of evidence presented to the jury, let alone whether the jury was
persuaded. Moreover, trial strategy would argue against risking
alienation of the sentencer by presenting "bizarre" evidence on the
off-hand chance that the sentencer may act irrationally. In his
Lockett dissent, Justice Rehnquist went so far as to express the belief that Lockett would not significantly alter existing practices:
[a]s a practical matter, I doubt that today's opinion will make a
great deal of difference in the manner in which trials in capital
cases are conducted, since I would suspect that it has been the
practice of most trial judges to permit a defendant to offer virtually any sort of evidence in his own defense as he wished."l 8
In fact, what empirical evidence does exist suggests that to the
extent sentencers are acting inconsistently as a result of inadequately guided discretion, the blame more properly is placed on a
failure to adequately narrowaggravatingfactors rather than on aberrational use of mitigating evidence. 1 9 Yet, when evaluating vague
aggravating factors, the Court has increasingly exhibited a willingness to find that the sentencer was adequately guided. In Walton
itself, the Court approved the use of an aggravating factor that required the murder be "especially heinous, cruel or depraved," even
though the Court conceded that, "the proper degree of definition of
an aggravating factor of this nature is not susceptible of mathemati117. See, e.g., Justice Scalia's listing of mitigating factors that have been argued,
supra note 107.
118. Lockett v. Ohio 438 U.S. 586, 631 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
119. See generally Geimer & Amsterdam, supra note 93, at 23-53. The authors
indicate that if any Lockett problems exist, they center on the danger that the sentencer
will limit too severely its consideration of mitigating evidence, id. at 23-39, not that
they are basing their decisions on "bizarre" mitigating factors; see also F. ZIMRING &
G. HAWKINS, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE AMERICAN AGENDA 87-91 (1986)
(studies demonstrate that sentencers are not being guided by statutory aggravating
factors).
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cal precision."'1 20 Given the Court's express deference to state court
findings that a defendant properly was found to be death eligible
1 21
it
under an aggravating factor that all concede is facially vague,
would be especially troubling if the Court imposed stricter limits on
the defendant's ability to present mitigating circumstances that establish why he should not be sentenced to death on the rationale
that the sentencer's discretion was not adequately guided. And, as
a majority of the Court has consistently recognized since Woodson
and Gregg, strong reasons exist why less control should be placed
on the sentencer's consideration of mitigating evidence than on its
1 22
use of aggravating factors.
Finally, Furman's concern with the arbitrary and capricious
implementation of the death penalty is not satisfied by consistency
alone. Identical punishment of unlike defendants may itself be arbitrary and capricious if what distinguishes the individuals would
convince the sentencer that different punishments are warranted.
The Lockett Court gave life to this principle when it found that
sentencer reliability would be enhanced by providing the defendant
the opportunity to tell the sentencer why, although death eligible,
she did not deserve to die. 123 Unless one is prepared to maintain
that the state can guarantee in advance that no mitigating factors
exist beyond those listed in a particular statute which would justify
a sentence less than death, the exclusion of such factors24from sentencing consideration is itself arbitrary and capricious.'
120. Walton v. Arizona, 110 S. Ct. 3047, 3058 (1990). The Arizona Supreme Court
had purported to give a limiting construction to the factor, which the majority relied
upon to find sentencer discretion was adequately guided. Id. After a thorough review

of the Arizona Supreme Court's precedent, however, the dissent concluded that the
heinous, cruel or depraved factor covered practically all first-degree murders. Id. at
3076-82 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
121. Lewis v. Jeffers, 110 S. Ct. 3092, 3102-03 (1990) (adopting "rational
factfinders" standard to determine if application of aggravating circumstance too
vague).
122. See supra notes 56-61 and accompanying text.
123. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 112 (1981) ("the rule in Lockett recognized that a consistency produced by ignoring individual differences is a false
consistency.").

124. The tension between the desire to have certainty and uniformity in the application of rules and the desire to adapt the rules for particular individuals runs throughout
the law. See generally Compassion and Judging, 22 ARIZ. ST. L.J 13 (1990) (panel
discussion of a judge's proper role in applying general rules to individual cases). Perhaps the most vivid and famous portrayal of the conflicting values is found not in the
law books but in Portia's response to Shylock after he has demanded the pound of flesh
he is entitled to under the law: "The quality of mercy is not strained. It droppeth as the

gentle rain from heaven [u]pon the place beneath.... It is an attribute to God himself;
[a]nd earthly power doth then show likest God's [w]hen mercy seasons justice." W.

1991]

THE LOCKETT PARADOX

1185

The above arguments are not meant to suggest that concerns
over whether the sentencer is properly able to evaluate mitigating
evidence are unfounded. No one can seriously contend that cases
do not exist where different sentencers would have come to divergent conclusions over whether the same evidence justified the death
penalty, just as cases have occurred where different triers of fact
would disagree over whether the government has proven that the
12 5 If
defendant committed the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
the death penalty decision is to be an individualized one, then some
1 26
risk of misuse of discretion will attach.
Given the empirical stand-off, the issue largely becomes one of
choosing between competing risks: the danger that a defendant may
receive a life rather than death sentence because the sentencer relied
on an arbitrary factor and the risk that an undeserving defendant
may receive the death penalty because the jury did not hear all mitigating factors calling for a sentence less than death. Where the argument is that the risk of arbitrariness justifies dispensing with the
principle of individualized consideration-a constitutional rule expressly intended to enhance sentencer reliability and minimize the
risk of erroneous sentences of death-the burden of proof should be
placed on those challenging the constitutional rule to show that the
risk has materialized. 127 The Lockett dissidents have yet to show
SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE 72-73 (D. Bevington ed. 1988).

The

translation of such notions from iambic pentameter into constitutional doctrine is an
admittedly difficult proposition. Cf. Schroeder, Compassion on Appeal, 22 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. at 45.
125. The appellate standard for reviewing jury verdicts of guilt is specifically
designed to acknowledge that rational jurors may vary in viewing the evidence, by asking whether "any rational trier of fact could have found [guilt] beyond a reasonable
doubt." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). The Court has adopted essentially the same standard for federal courts reviewing whether an aggravating factor was
properly found by the State Courts. Lewis, 110 S. Ct. at 3102-03.
126. Cf. Walton v. Arizona, 110 S. Ct. 3047, 3092 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(acknowledging mandatory death penalty may yield greater certainty, but arguing
Woodson-Lockett is "not only wiser, but far more just.").
127. Cf. Hertz & Weisberg, supra note 56, at 376 ("An erroneous decision to extinguish the defendant's life is far more opprobrious than an erroneous decision to spare
the defendant and sentence him to life imprisonment."); Special Project, supra note 104,
at 1162 (Lockett "probably correct" despite dangers associated with increased sentencer
discretion).
To some degree, it is more difficult to speak of erroneous death sentences in the
same sense one speaks of erroneous convictions. Because the death penalty decision
involves a moral or evaluative component, it may seem incongruous to say such a decision was in error. See Weisberg, supra note 7, at 326, 342-43 (noting difficulty of calling a death penalty decision erroneous). Yet to the extent it is agreed that certain types
of mitigating evidence will materially affect how a defendant's culpability is assessed,
excluding such evidence does increase the risk that the defendant will receive a death
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that Lockett has resulted in the irrational scenarios that they have
prophesized.
C.

The Consequences of Overruling Lockett

Given Justice Scalia's express goal of bringing greater coherence and stability to the eighth amendment, it is important to examine the consequences if Justice Scalia should prevail in
convincing the Court to overturn Lockett on the ground that its
definition of relevance yields arbitrary and capricious results.
Whether Justice Scalia's goal would be achieved is questionable, because overruling Lockett on arbitrariness grounds would create its
28
own significant constitutional side effects.'
First, by removing Lockett discretion from the sentencer, the
Court will disrupt its eighth amendment disproportionality review. 129 When deciding whether the death penalty is disproportionate to a particular offense or offender, and therefore in discord with
"contemporary standards of decency," the Court has relied on two
primary indicators: how many legislatures authorize the death penalty in the defendant's case and whether sentencers are actually sentencing defendants to death in similar circumstances. 30 For
example, the infrequency with which sentencers actually imposed
the death penalty on rapists was an important factor in the Court's
decision that the death penalty was disproportionate for the crime
of rape. 131
If sentencer discretion is removed or severely limited, this important indicia of whether a particular use of the death penalty is in
accord with "contemporary values" is lost, because sentencers will
be unable to refuse to impose the death penalty on the broad
penalty that the sentencer otherwise would believe unjustified. Evaluative judgments
may still be in "error" if the judgment would have been made differently except that the
evaluator was unaware or not allowed to consider material facts. Cf. Radin, supra note
62, at 1179-80 (analyzing risk of "moral error" present in death penalty decisionmaking
process).
128. The likelihood that mandatory death penalties will produce their own constitutional problems has already been addressed. See supra notes 80-92 and accompanying
text.
129. The need for the Court to change its current disproportionality analysis if
Woodson is overruled and mandatory death penalties are allowed is discussed, supra
notes 85-89 and accompanying text.
130. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 181-82 (1976) (plurality opinion).
131. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 596-97 (1977) (plurality opinion) (relying

in part on fact that Georgia juries sentence rapists to death in only one out of ten cases
to find death penalty disproportional); see also Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782,
794-96 (1982) (relying in part on juries' rejection of death penalty for non-triggermen
convicted of felony-murder to find death penalty disproportional).
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grounds that it is inappropriate. 32 The Court primarily will be left
to counting the number of states authorizing the particular use.
However, authorization does not mean sentencers are in fact finding
the death penalty to be justified under the authorized circumstances; only sentencer behavior can show whether community values actually support a particular use of the death penalty.' 33 The
Court might try to rely on sentencer nullification as a gauge, but it
would be extremely difficult to judge whether sentencers imposing
the death penalty for a particular crime were doing so because they
agreed it was justified under the circumstances, or because they felt
compelled to follow the law even though they believed the death
penalty was not warranted. In other words, relying on jury nullification runs a high risk of "false positives" because sentencers may
be sentencing particular defendants to death only because they believe they must follow the law.
The second and most disruptive ramification of overruling
Lockett will be the necessity of redefining the proper role of mitigating factors under the eighth amendment and modifying existing
death penalty statutes accordingly. If Justice Scalia truly is correct
that Lockett is producing results in violation of Furman, then it is
difficult to see how the Court would not be forced to overrule
Gregg's approval of a provision in Georgia's statute that allowed
the sentencer to consider all mitigating factors and to exercise
"mercy" by declining to impose the death penalty even if no mitigating factors existed.' 34 The only way to continue to uphold the
statute approved in Gregg after concluding that Lockett's holding
"destroys . . . rationality and predictability"'' 35 would be to argue
that a state may choose to have an open-ended mitigation scheme
but cannot constitutionally be required to do so. Justice Scalia
hinted at this distinction when he stated, "It is difficult enough to
132. The problem is especially great now that the court has held that the state need
not let the jury evaluate the severity of the aggravating circumstance in a particular
case. See Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 110 S. Ct. 1078, 1083-84 (upholding statute requiring death penalty if sentencer finds one or more aggravating circumstances and no mitigating factors, because aggravating factors are only for "limiting the class of deatheligible defendants, [and need not] be further refined or weighed by a jury."). Blystone,
however, may have been premised in part on the notion that the severity of the aggravating factors-or, more precisely, lack of severity-could itself be considered as mitigating evidence. Cf. id. at 1083-84 & n.5. If Lockett is overruled, then the sentencer's
ability to compensate for a lack of severity of an aggravating factor on the mitigating
side of the equation would be removed.
133. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 182.
134. Id. at 203 (plurality opinion); id. at 221-22 (White, J., concurring).
135. Walton v. Arizona, 110 S. Ct. 3047, 3063 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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justify the Furman requirement so long as the states are permitted
to allow random mitigation; but to impose it while simultaneously
136
requiring random mitigation is absurd."
Such a distinction not only is difficult, it is nonsensical. If an
open-ended mitigation scheme undermines Furman by allowing unbridled sentencer discretion, the effect exists whether the state
adopts the scheme by choice or by constitutional coercion. Therefore, invalidating Lockett because its broad definition of relevant
mitigating evidence contradicts Furman also requires overturning
Gregg's approval of Georgia's statute. Distinguishing between "requiring" and "permitting" states to utilize such schemes makes
sense if the argument simply is that Lockett is not constitutionally
based,' 3 7 but does not work where the claim is that the effect of a
Lockett-type scheme results in unacceptable arbitrariness.
Recognizing that overruling Lockett also requires invalidating
the Georgia statute approved in Gregg makes clear that abandoning
Lockett does not necessarily remove the Court from constitutional
review of mitigating factors. Justice Scalia's argument that to not
limit mitigating evidence violates Furman'sban on unbridled discretion means the states would be constitutionally obligated to specify relevant mitigating circumstances. Just as a state would violate
the eighth amendment by failing to adequately narrow the deatheligible pool by specifying aggravating circumstances, so presumably would a state that failed to adequately guide the death penalty
decision by specifying mitigating circumstances. The question currently asked under Lockett-whether the state unconstitutionally
limits the sentencer's consideration of mitigating evidence-would
be turned upside down to ask whether the state adequately limits
the sentencer's consideration of mitigating evidence. The Court still
would be looking over the state's shoulder, except now it would be
to ensure that the state was sufficiently limiting mitigating circumstances to satisfy the eighth amendment.
This continuing duty would occur whether or not the Court
also overrules Woodson as not properly interpreting the eighth
amendment. If the Court rules that Woodson's requirement of
some individualized consideration remains valid but that Lockett
went too far down the continuum, 38 the Court then will have to
decide which mitigating factors adequately protect the principle of
individualized consideration without slipping over the line of giving
136. Id. at 3064 (emphasis in original).
137. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
138. See supra notes 66-73 and accompanying text.
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the sentencer too much discretion. Trying to find such a balance,
and deciding mitigating factor by mitigating factor whether the factor is constitutionally required, surely would not yield the predictability sought by Justice Scalia. Indeed, the need to provide
certainty and guidance was one of the reasons the Lockett plurality
opted for a broad-based rule rather than attempting to resolve the
139
issue on a case-by-case basis.
Even if Woodson were overruled along with Lockett so that no
constitutional principle of individualized consideration would apply, the Court would not be free of overseeing mitigating factors. If
Lockett's mitigation scheme violates Furman, the immediate effect,
of course, would be to invalidate all existing death penalty schemes,
since they have been legislatively or judicially modified to meet
Lockett's requirements. Once the states modified their statutes in
response to the initial fall out, the Court would now be faced with
reverse Lockett issues: Does the scheme give too much discretion to
the sentencer to consider mitigating factors? Are the mitigating factors sufficiently limited and narrowly defined? Is the sentencer sufficiently guided on how to use the mitigating evidence?140 Only
mandatory death penalty schemes would be free of such questions,
but they raise other constitutional problems. 141
Theoretically, therefore, reversal of Lockett on the rationale
that it produces arbitrary death penalties would require continued
constitutional supervision over how the states used or did not use
mitigating factors. In practice, though, given the evident motivations for overruling Lockett, the wise legal handicapper would wager that actual judicial supervision of state limitations on mitigating
circumstances would be deferential. 42 Justice Scalia has made it
evident that although he has cast his argument against Lockett in
terms of Furman arbitrariness, one of his fundamental reasons for
wanting to reverse Lockett is the desire to cede control back to the
139. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 602 (1978).
140. Because a defendant sentenced to life is not going to challenge a statute for
providing too much mitigation, any such challenge would have to come, as in Furman
and Gregg, from a defendant who has been sentenced to death.
141. See supra notes 82-92 and accompanying text.
142. Justice White, for example, did not find it inconsistent to uphold Georgia's
open-ended mitigation scheme as constitutional in Gregg and yet argue in Lockett that
an open-ended mitigation requirement would result in a reversion to a pre-Furmanstate
of affairs. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 623 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Still, if history is bound to repeat itself, then past experience suggests that when
the Court embraces a new principle in the capital punishment area-like the view that
open-ended consideration of mitigating evidence violates Furman--confusion is likely
to follow.
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states and minimize federal overview: "The issue is whether, in the
process of the individualized sentencing determination, the society
may specify which factors are relevant, and which are not."1 43 But
if the Court were to take a hands-off approach to state uses of mitigating factors, it would suggest that much of the ado over Lockett's
inconsistency with Furman was really a decoy argument to justify
making the relevance of mitigating factors a matter for the states
rather than the eighth amendment. If this is the true reason driving
the move to overrule Lockett, it would be better to do so directly by
finding that Lockett's federalizing of mitigating factors was not
properly based in the eighth amendment, rather than acting as if
Lockett's demise was brought about by its own shortcomings.
III.

THE ATTACK ON LOCKETT's REARGUARD: CONTROLLING
THE SUBSTANCE THROUGH THE PROCEDURE

The Rise of the Substance-ProcedureDistinction
Justice Scalia's frontal assault on Lockett was aimed at returning to the states substantive control over the mitigating factors
that a sentencer can use in deciding to impose the death penalty.
Despite Justice Scalia's failure in Walton to directly remove Lockett's control over the substance of mitigating evidence, the Court
arguably has accomplished much of Justice Scalia's goal through a
rearguard action that gives the states significant control over the
procedures that the sentencer may use in processing the mitigating
evidence it receives under Lockett. As part of an emerging trend,
the Court has taken a recognized eighth amendment principle that
places substantive limits on the states' power to impose capital punishment and diluted its strength by deferring to the state's chosen
method of implementing the principle. 4
A.

143. Walton v. Arizona, 110 S.Ct. at 3047, 3064 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring).
144. A similar pattern of creating the substantive right but deferring to state implementation-can be seen in the Court's rulings concerning exclusion of jurors with
scruples against the death penalty, compare Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968)
(may exclude juror for cause only if "unmistakably clear" that juror would "automatically" vote against death penalty) with Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985) (standard is whether juror's attitude would "substantially impair" performance of duties and
state court's determination is presumed correct); in the Court's rulings on the need to
find sufficient culpability by the defendant, compare Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782
(1982) (death penalty disproportionate for non-triggerman who does not intend to kill)
with Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376 (1986) (determination of whether non-triggerman
sufficiently culpable can be made by appellate court rather than fact-finder); and in its
determinations on whether aggravating circumstances adequately narrow the death
penalty pool, compare Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980) (aggravating circumstance invalid because not adequately limited by state court) with Lewis v. Jeffers, 110 S.
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By drawing a distinction between the substance of mitigating
evidence and the procedure for considering such evidence, a majority of the Court for the first time has begun to limit Lockett's reach:
Lockett and Eddings do not speak directly, if at all, to the issue
presented here ....
[The petitioner] asks us to create a rule
relating, not to what mitigating evidence the jury must be permitted to consider in making its sentencing decision, but to how it
must consider the mitigating evidence. There is a simple and logical difference between rules that govern what factors the jury
must be permitted to consider in making its sentencing decision,
and rules that govern how the State may guide the jury in considering and weighing those factors in reaching a decision. 145
While the substance-procedure distinction has gained currency
among a majority of the Court, its full implications for returning
power to the states remains to be seen. The cases suggest, however,
that the distinction holds potential for giving states significant control over the use of mitigating evidence.
The Lockett Court arguably opened the door to the proceduresubstance distinction when it observed that "[t]here is no perfect
procedure for deciding in which cases governmental -authority
should be used to impose death."' 46 The distinction, however, remained dormant in the immediate post-Lockett era. It was not until
later that the distinction began to appear in concurrences and dissents as an argument for upholding state procedures even though
the procedures clearly affected evidence within Lockett's definition.
In Skipper v. South Carolina,147 for example, the majority had
found that the trial court's exclusion of evidence that the defendant
had behaved well in jail after his arrest violated Lockett because
favorable inferences from it "would be 'mitigating' in the sense that
they might serve 'as a basis for a sentence less than death.' "148 In a
special concurrence, however, Justice Powell argued that even if the
evidence was within Lockett's definition, 149 the question of whether
Ct. 3092 (1990) (in determining whether state adequately narrows aggravating factor,
must defer to state finding unless "wholly arbitrary").
145. Saffle v. Parks, 110 S. Ct. 1257, 1261 (1990). In Parks, the Court found that
Lockett did not preclude telling the jury not to be influenced by sympathy. The Court
reasoned that an anti-sympathy instruction did not tell the jury they could not consider
the defendant's mitigating evidence, but only how they were to consider it. See also
infra note 170.
146. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 605 (plurality opinion).
147. 476 U.S. 1 (1986).
148. Id. at 4-5 (quoting Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604).
149. Justice Powell first argued that good behavior after the crime did not bear on
the defendant's culpability or character and, therefore, did not fall within Lockett's protection. Id. at 11-14.
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such evidence was sufficiently probative of the factor to be admissible was an evidentiary issue to be resolved by state law:
The Court's [refusal to defer to the state court's decision on probity] apparently rests on the notion that the States have little or
no authority to decide that certain types of evidence may have
insufficient probative value to justify their admission .... This
Court has no special expertise in deciding whether particular categories of evidence are too speculative or insubstantial to merit
consideration by the sentencer .... It makes little sense, then, to
substitute our judgment of relevance for that of state courts and
legislatures. Nor is such intrusive review necessary in this context to guard against fundamentally unjust executions.150
Justice Powell concluded that the Lockett opinion had specifically
left such decisions to the states when it said, "Nothing in this opinion limits the traditional authority of a court to exclude as irrelevant, evidence not bearing on the defendant's character, prior
5
record, or the circumstances of his offense."' '
Although the majority did not directly respond to Justice Powell's argument, the difference in conclusions can be explained based
on whether the South Carolina courts' exclusion of the evidence is
viewed as a "what" or "how" issue. The majority viewed the state
court actions as invading the federal constitutional province of what
constitutes relevant mitigating evidence because the state had excluded the evidence of good prison behavior after arrest as irrelevant under Lockett. The majority expressly disagreed with that
conclusion, finding the evidence to be relevant as to whether the
defendant should receive a life rather than death sentence. Therefore, Lockett's caveat that its holding did not preempt the states'
"traditional authority" to determine relevance would not be applicable, because that authority only extends to evidence outside of
Lockett's protected zone, "evidence not bearing on the defendant's
152
character, prior record, or the circumstances of the offense."'
Justice Powell, on the other hand, maintained that even if constitutionally relevant, the exclusion of the evidence could be justified
based on reliability and probity concerns, which are state law matters independent of "what" is a mitigating factor under Lockett.
This early effort to characterize a state rule as bearing on "how"
Lockett evidence was to be treated rather than as telling the sen150. Id. at 15.
151. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604 n.12, quoted in Skipper, 476 U.S. at 15 (Powell, J.,
concurring).
152. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604 n. 12. The Skipper majority made clear, for example,
that the states could exclude evidence of a defendant's good hygiene practices as irrelevant under Lockett. See Skipper, 476 U.S. at 7 n.2.
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tencer "what" mitigating evidence they could consider was doomed
for several reasons. First, the state courts primarily had cast their
rationale for exclusion on relevancy grounds, creating at least the
appearance that they had decided admissibility directly based on
Lockett. 153 Moreover, the state evidentiary grounds relied upon
(probative value) operated to keep the evidence entirely from the
sentencer. The Court consistently has viewed state procedures that
completely preclude sentencer consideration of mitigating evidence
as taboo efforts to tell the sentencer what mitigating evidence to
consider. 15 4 In contrast, if the sentencer is allowed to consider the
evidence, even if just to apply the evidentiary rules or procedures
and determine that the evidence cannot properly be used, the procedures are much more likely to be seen as "how" issues.' 55
A similar analysis explains the Court's decision in Sumner v.
Shuman, 56 where it struck down Nevada's mandatory death penalty for a prisoner who commits a murder while serving a life sentence without parole. The Lockett Court expressly had left the
question open.' 57 Most notable was Justice Blackmun's strong argument that even in such an extreme case important mitigating factors might exist which would lead the sentencer to find that the
death penalty was not appropriate for all defendants in that situation. For example, important differences might exist between defendants' backgrounds, the severity of the crime for which they
were serving the life sentence, or the particular circumstances of the
capital murder itself.'58 Only through the principle of "individualized sentencing" and the opportunity to hear mitigating circumstances would the sentencer be able to respond to these factors and
decide if a particular defendant deserved to die. Nor was the Court
persuaded that special needs of deterrence and retribution existed
which required a mandatory death penalty, because "any legitimate
153. Skipper, 476 U.S. at 6-7 (summarizing state court opinions). The State later
attempted to advance other evidentiary grounds besides relevance for excluding the evidence, but the majority rejected them as inapplicable to the facts. Id. at 5-8.
154. See, e.g., Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95 (1979) (Georgia's hearsay rule could
not be used to exclude mitigating evidence at penalty trial).
155. See infra notes 161-167, 183-188 and accompanying text (discussing weighing
instructions and burden of proof requirements as "how" issues).
156. 483 U.S. 66 (1987).
157. Lockett v. Ohio 438 U.S. 586, 604 n.l (1978) (plurality opinion). The Court
also had held the question open in its original mandatory death penalty cases. Roberts
v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 334 n.9 (1976) (plurality opinion).
158. Sumner, 483 U.S. at 78-82.
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state interests can be satisfied fully through the use of a guided'' 9
discretion statute. 5
The Court's opinion in Sumner made evident that any departures from Lockett's fundamental principle that the state cannot
preclude the sentencer from hearing all constitutionally relevant evidence would need to meet an extremely high burden of justification. Again, the state's efforts to control what mitigating factors the
sentencer could consider were seen as stepping into the off-limits
area staked out by Lockett. This point was made clear by the dissent's lament that, "Until today, the Court has never held that the
constitution prohibits a State from identifying an especially aggravated and exceedingly narrow category of first-degree murder,...
and determining as a matter of law and social policy that no combination of mitigating factors ... could ever warrant reduction of a
sentence of death."160
In contrast to the cases in which the states have attempted to
control what mitigating evidence can be considered, the Court recently has upheld state statutes which direct the sentencer how to
weigh the aggravating and mitigating evidence. In Blystone v. Pennsylvania,161 the majority upheld a statute which required the sentencer to impose death "if the jury unanimously finds at least one
aggravating circumstance ... and no mitigating circumstance or if
the jury unanimously finds one or more aggravating circumstances
162 The defendant
which outweigh any mitigating circumstances."
had argued that the statute in effect operated as a mandatory death
penalty by requiring the jury to return a sentence of death once it
found aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating
circumstances.
Without expressly invoking the "what-how" dichotomy, Chief
Justice Rehnquist responded by finding that Lockett's mandate was
fulfilled because the jury had been allowed "to consider all relevant
mitigating evidence" and any guidance to the jury beyond that
threshold requirement was within the "traditional latitude [enjoyed
by the States] to prescribe the method by which those who commit
159. Id. at 85. The state had argued that because the defendant already was serving
a life sentence, only a mandatory death penalty could adequately deter and serve retribution interests. Id. at 83.
160. Id. at 87 (White, J., dissenting).
161.

110 S. Ct. 1078 (1990).

162. Id. at 1081 (quoting 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 971 1(c)(l)(iv) (Purdon
1982)).
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murder shall be punished." 163 The Chief Justice thus viewed Lockett as a threshold requirement which prevented the state from keeping constitutionally relevant mitigating evidence from being
considered by the sentencer, but did not extend to precluding the
state, at least within reasonable bounds, from telling the sentencer
how to use the evidence. 164
In Boyde v. California165 the Court reaffirmed that it was permissible for the state to direct the sentencer how to weigh aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The Court upheld a jury
instruction that told the jury, "If you conclude that the aggravating
circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances you shall impose a sentence of death." The Chief Justice rejected the argument
that Lockett's principle of individualized sentencing required that a
sentencer have the freedom not to impose the death penalty even
where aggravating circumstances outweighed mitigating circumstances: "[T]here is no such constitutional requirement of unfettered sentencing discretion in the jury, and States are free to
structure and shape consideration of mitigating evidence 'in an effort to achieve a more rational and equitable administration of-the
death penalty.' 166 Indeed, the Chief Justice gave an indirect blessing to state measures controlling consideration of mitigating evidence when he characterized the defendant's argument as a call for
"unfettered sentencing discretion." 167
The substance-procedure dichotomy, or what-how distinction,
has an undeniable appeal. As an initial matter, it strikes the underlying chord of compromise inherent in federalism: core constitutional values are kept safely within the federal safehouse while the
states are given substantial leeway in shaping how the values will be
translated into practice. Thus in the area of mitigating circumstances, the substance of what is protected by Lockett's mandate of
individualized sentencing remains off-limits to the states, while the
procedure for its implementation is left to the best judgment of the
states.
163. Id. at 1083-84 & n.5 (distinguishing Sumner v. Shuman because in that case
the sentencer had no opportunity to consider mitigating evidence).
164. Id. at 1083-84.
165. 110 S.Ct. 1190 (1990). In Walton v. Arizona, 110 S.Ct. 3047, 3056 (1990), the
Court summarily upheld mandatory "shall" language in the Arizona statute by simply
recounting its holdings in Boyde and Blystone.
166. Boyde, 110 S.Ct. at 1196 (quoting Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 181
(1988) (plurality opinion)).
167. Id.
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Moreover, by allowing the states to structure how mitigating
evidence is to be used, some of the tension between Furman's call
for guided discretion and Lockett's requirement of unrestricted
1 68 Fears
presentation of relevant mitigating evidence is relieved.
that sentencers will use mitigating evidence in an irrational manner
can be calmed by pointing to state procedures telling sentencers
how to use the evidence. As a bonus, the Court accomplishes such
a reconciliation without having to get into the business of dictating
proper procedures. The Court simply sits as a hands-off overseer to
ensure state procedures are "rational."
B.

Telling the Sentencer How to Decide: What is the Nature of
the Death Penalty Decision?

Despite its inherent appeal, the substance-procedure distinction has several important implications that need to be acknowledged and addressed. Most fundamentally, it endorses a view that
the sentencer's decision to impose or not impose the death penalty
is a logical, almost mathematical, evaluation of the aggravating and
mitigating evidence. The paradigm invoked is that of the scales of
justice: the sentencer places the aggravating factors on one side and
mitigating factors on the other and decides which "outweighs" the
other. Additionally, this paradigm assumes that even before the
mitigating evidence is put on the scales, the evidence, for example
evidence of a troubled childhood, can be pre-screened by evidentiary devices such as burdens of proof.
This view of the death penalty as a calculated decision helps
69
explain the majority's view in California v. Brown,' in which the
Court upheld an instruction to the jury that it should not base its
decision on "mere sympathy." The majority reasoned in part that
such an instruction helps enhance the reliability of the jury's decision by ensuring emotional responses will not enter into the equation.1 70 As Justice O'Connor wrote in her concurrence:
168. See supra notes 49-61 and accompanying text.
169. 479 U.S. 538 (1987).
170. Brown, 479 U.S. at 543 ("[T]o the extent that the instruction helps to limit the
jury's consideration to matters introduced in evidence.., it fosters the Eighth Amendment's 'need for reliability' ") (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305
(1976)). As with many death penalty decisions, see supra note 34, it is not entirely clear
whether Chief Justice Rehniquist's opinion is a majority or plurality opinion. Although
four other justices joined the opinion, one of them, Justice O'Connor, wrote a concurrence setting out her own reasoning.
It appeared that Brown might contain an interesting difference in viewpoint be-

tween Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor's opinions over the role of emotion
in the sentencer's decision. Justice O'Connor appeared to argue that any emotion or
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[T]he sentence imposed at the penalty stage should reflect a reasoned moral response to the defendant's background, character
and crime rather than mere sympathy or emotion. . . . [T]he
individualized assessment of the appropriateness of the death
penalty is a moral inquiry into the culpability of the defendant,
171
and not an emotional response to the mitigating evidence.
If one views the death penalty decision as a calculated weighing and
processing of information free from emotion, then state procedures
fostering "more rational" decisions will not only be constitutionally
permissible, but desirable.
On the other hand, if the death penalty decision is regarded as
based in part on emotional, or at least not on "rational" factors as
traditionally conceived, then such procedures frustrate the "individualized" decisionmaking process of Lockett. This is the perspective
reflected in Justice Blackmun's dissent in Brown, where he argued
that the anti-sympathy instruction may have dissuaded the jury
from taking "mercy" on the defendant:
The sentencer's ability to respond with mercy towards a defendant has always struck me as a particularly valuable aspect of the
capital sentencing procedure. . . . In my view, we adhere so
strongly to our belief that sentencers should have the opportunity
to spare a capital defendant's life on account of compassion for
the individual because, recognizing that the capital sentencing
decision must be made in the context of 'contemporary values,'. . . we see in the sentencer's expression of mercy a distinctive feature of our society that we deeply value.... [When] a jury
member is moved to be merciful to the defendant, an instruction
telling the juror that he or she cannot be "swayed" by sympathy
well may arrest or restrain this humane response, with truly fatal
consequences for the defendant. This possibility I cannot accept,
in light of the special role of mercy in capital sentencing and the
stark finality of the death sentence. 172
sympathy was improper, because the decision was to be a "reasoned" one. The Chief
Justice's opinion, on the other hand, could be read as saying that emotion based on
proper mitigating evidence was acceptable, and it was only "extraneous" emotion not
based on the evidence that the sentencer could be told to ignore. See, e.g., Parks v.
Brown, 860 F.2d 1545 (10th Cir. 1988) (defendant has right to have jury consider sympathy and emotion based on mitigating evidence). The majority opinion in Saffle v.
Parks, 110 S. Ct. 1257 (1990) appeared to resolve any potential conflict in favor of
Justice O'Connor's view that emotion and sympathy could properly be excluded from
sentencer considerations even if based upon properly admitted mitigating evidence. Id.
at 1262-63 (emotion and sympathy undermine need for decision to impose death penalty to be non-arbitrary and reliable).
171. Brown, 479 U.S. at 545 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also supra notes
112-113 and accompanying text (Justice Scalia's critique of the concepts articulated by
Justice O'Connor).
172. Id. at 562-63 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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The need to accommodate the "humane response" of "compassion" also forms the basis for the argument why a statute that requires the sentencer to impose the death penalty if it finds one or
more aggravating circumstances but no mitigating circumstances
violates Lockett: the mandatory aspect of the provision takes away
the sentencer's ability to exercise compassion based on an overall
173 One might still use
assessment of the defendant and his crime.
Justice O'Connor's phrase "reasoned moral response" to describe
the sentencer's decision to not impose the death penalty despite the
lack of a formal finding of mitigating factors, but the "moral"
judgement would include the possibility of a "human response" not
based strictly on a state-guided weighing of the circumstances. The
pans on the scales of justice would have to accommodate not only
"facts" sifted through the burden of proof sieve, but also intangibles
based on human responses outside the traditional realm of logic and
1 74
reason.
173. Cf. Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 110 S. Ct. 1078, 1092 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that Pennsylvania statute requiring jury to impose death penalty if it
finds an aggravating circumstance but no mitigating factors is unconstitutional because,
"[flinding an aggravating circumstance does not entail any moral judgment about the
nature of the act or the actor, and therefore it does not give the jury an opportunity to
decide whether it believes the defendant's particular offense warrants the death
penalty.").
174. The California Supreme Court, for example, has held that a jury instruction
telling the jury that "if you conclude that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the
mitigating circumstances, you shall impose a sentence of death," is impermissible unless
it is also communicated that the sentencer ultimately must decide what is the appropriate penalty. People v. Brown, (Brown I), 40 Cal. 3d. 512, 538-44, 726 P.2d 516,
532-34, 220 Cal. Rptr. 637, 653-55 (1985), rev'd on other grounds, 479 U.S. 538 (1987).
As Justice Grodin explained,
In [the death penalty] context, the word 'weighing' is a metaphor for a
process which by nature is incapable of precise description. The word
connotes a mental balancing process, but certainly not one which calls for
a mere mechanical counting of factors on each side of the imaginary
'scale,' or the arbitrary assignment of 'weights' to any of them. Each
juror is free to assign whatever moral or sympathetic value he deems appropriate to each and all of the various factors he is permitted to consider
...Thus the jury, by weighing the various factors, simply determines
under the relevant evidence which penalty is appropriate in the particular
case.

Id. at 541, 726 P.2d at 532, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 653. The California Supreme Court has
reaffirmed its adherence to the view that the statute's weighing language must not lead
the jury to believe that it does not have sole discretion to determine whether the death
penalty is appropriate. See People v. Milner, 45 Cal. 3d 227, 753 P.2d 669, 246 Cal.
Rptr. 713 (1988); People v. Brown (Brown II), 45 Cal. 3d 1247, 1258-59, 756 P.2d 204,
211, 248 Cal. Rptr. 817, 824 (1988). It remains to be seen whether the California
Supreme Court will continue to adhere to this viewpoint as a matter of state law given
the United States Supreme Court's approval of the "shall" language in Boyde v. California, 110 S. Ct. 1190, 1195-96 (1990).
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That a majority of the Court would reject such a vision of the
death penalty decision is not surprising. The view strongly clashes
with the archetype of legal thought in which justice is based on calculation and logic, not "human response," and, if fully applied to
the death penalty, would heighten the tension already present between Furman's condemnation of unbridled discretion and Lockett's definition of mitigating evidence. If Lockett was extended to
require constitutionally that a trump card of mercy be given the
sentencer, the cases would become even more difficult to reconcile.
Lockett no longer would be justified by the rationale of producing
more reliable decisions by ensuring that all relevant evidence is
heard by the sentencer; instead, the sentencer would have an affirmative grant of power to act even where no evidence falls within
Lockett's definition of relevant evidence. This use of Lockett would
require the Court to expressly accept the idea that the nature of the
death penalty decision is so unique that, once an aggravating factor
is found, complete discretion must be vested in the sentencer. This
view obviously has proven too much for a majority of the current
Court to accept.
C.

Telling the "What"from the "How"

Beyond its more general implications for how the Court conceptualizes the death penalty decision, the substance-procedure distinction holds the potential of significantly restricting Lockett's role
in capital sentencing. The potential primarily stems from the inherent difficulty of determining whether a rule goes to the substantive
or procedural aspect of the mitigating evidence, creating the possibility that the procedural "exception" will swallow Lockett's substantive rule. This problem should not be a great surprise to anyone
who has struggled with the procedure-substance distinctions governing "Erie questions" of whether the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or state law applies to diversity claims brought in federal
court. 17 5 In the relatively short time that a majority of the Court
has used the distinction in the death penalty context, the Court already has severely divided on six occasions over whether an issue
175. See generally E. CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 266 (1989) ("a simple principle emerges after Erie: federal courts are to apply state substantive law and
federal procedural law. The problem is that distinctions between substance and procedure are inherently ephemeral and thus difficult to draw.... Ever since Erie, the Court
has struggled to provide criteria to determine when federal law may be used in diversity
cases."); Ely, The IrrepressibleMyth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693 (1974). Erie questions, like Lockett issues, also involve delicate questions of power allocation between the
federal and state spheres of sovereignty.
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techwas a 'core' Lockett violation or involved only a procedural
176
nique for governing the processing of mitigating factors.
In McKoy v. North Carolina,177for example, a majority of the
Court struck down North Carolina's requirement that a mitigating
circumstance be found unanimously by the jury before it could be
weighed against aggravating circumstances. According to the majority, the scheme's infirmity was that one holdout juror could prevent the other jurors from individually giving effect to the
defendant's mitigating evidence. Indeed, the possibility existed that
all twelve jurors would believe valid mitigating evidence was present, but because they could not unanimously agree on any one mitigating factor, the defendant could not benefit from any of the
constitutionally relevant'mitigating factors. 178 The majority also
specifically rejected the State's argument that a factor became "irrelevant" under state law if not unanimously found, making clear
that the relevance of mitigating evidence is a federal constitutional
question not dependent upon a state's "mere declaration that evidence is 'legally irrelevant.' ",179 The Court concluded that the relevance of mitigating evidence under Lockett did not depend upon
whether the sentencer in fact accepted or rejected the evidence, but
rather on whether the evidence reasonably could have led the sen18 0
tencer to find that a sentence less than death was warranted.
Consequently, a majority saw the unanimity requirement as an impermissible attempt by the state to determine for the sentencer what
was relevant mitigating evidence, rather than as a procedure aimed
at guiding the sentencer's use of relevant mitigating evidence.
Three justices, on the other hand, viewed the unanimity requirement "not [as] a limitation upon what the sentencer was allowed to give effect to, but rather [as] a limitation upon the manner
176. See Walton v. Arizona, 110 S.Ct. 3047 (1990); Saffle v. Parks, 110 S. Ct. 1257
(1990); McKoy v. North Carolina, 110 S. Ct. 1227 (1990); Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S.Ct.
2934 (1989); Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164 (1988); Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S.

367 (1988).
177. 110 S. Ct. 1227 (1990). The decision reflected the Court's earlier holding in
Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367 (1988), which had struck down Maryland's requirement that the jury be unanimous in finding mitigating circumstances. The North Carolina Supreme Court had tried to distinguish Mills in part on the basis that the North

Carolina law, unlike Maryland's, allowed the jury to return a life sentence even if no
mitigating evidence was found. See McKoy, 110 S.Ct. at 1231. The Court still found
the possibility, however, that a single holdout juror could essentially require imposition
of the death penalty by preventing consideration of mitigating evidence the other eleven
jurors would otherwise use. Id.; see also id. at 1239 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

178. See id. at 1231-32.
179. See id. at 1232.
180. See id.
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in which it was allowed to do so-viz., only unanimously." 18 1
Writing for the dissenters, Justice Scalia argued that the whole jury
was in fact the sentencer, so that requiring the whole jury to agree
on specific mitigating factors did not preclude the jury from giving
effect to mitigating factors. Rather, the requirement served merely
a procedural device for guiding the jury's consideration. Justice
Scalia concluded:
In short, Lockett and Eddings are quite simply irrelevant to the
question before us, and cannot be pressed into service by describing them as establishing that "a sentencer [by which the reader is
invited to understand an individual member of the jury] may not
be precluded from giving effect to all mitigating evidence."' 81 2
The dispute in McKoy over whether jury unanimity fell within
the "what" or "how" category is best explained as a dispute over
who is the sentencer under the death penalty scheme. If each juror
is a separate sentencer and the jury verdict is simply a tabulation of
individual votes, then the unanimity requirement's effect is to preclude the sentencer, i.e. individual jurors, from being able to give
weight to relevant mitigating evidence as they find appropriate. If
Justice Scalia is correct, however, that the sentencer is in fact the
whole jury making a consensus judgment, then the claim that the
requirement is really a procedural device to guide the jury's use of
mitigating evidence is more colorable. More colorable, that is, if
threshold requirements for consideration of mitigating factors are in
fact "guiding" rather than "precluding" devices.
The elusiveness of the distinction between "guiding" and "precluding" also can be seen in the Court's ruling in Walton v. Arizona.18 3 In Walton, the Court considered Arizona's requirement
that the sentencer, under Arizona's scheme the trial judge, find that
the defendant had proven by a preponderance of the evidence mitigating circumstances "sufficiently substantial to call for leniency.' 8 4 The defendant had argued that such a requirement
181. Id. at 1245 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
182. Id. at 1245-46 (Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 869 (1982) strongly reaffirmed
Lockett's requirement that state law not preclude the sentencer from considering all
mitigating evidence). Justice Kennedy's concurrence appears more in sympathy with
the dissent's view that the unanimity requirement is a "how" (procedural) rather than
"what" (substantive) issue, but he believed that the requirement as used in North
Carolina was an arbitrary procedural control. See id. at 1239-40 (Kennedy, J., concurring);
see also infra notes 191-192 and accompanying text (arguing McKoy better seen as a
"how" case).
183. 110 S. Ct. 3047 (1990).
184. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(E) (1989). The requirement that the defend-

ant prove mitigating circumstances by a preponderance of the evidence is based on the
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violated Lockett because it effectively excluded relevant evidence
that the sentencer must constitutionally be allowed to consider.
Therefore, just as a jury unanimity requirement might preclude a
sentencer from being able to consider relevant mitigating circumstances, Walton argued that the Arizona scheme might prevent the
sentencer from giving effect to relevant mitigating factors, albeit
factors not proven by a preponderance of the evidence.
A divided Court upheld the evidentiary requirement with little
explanation. The plurality simply found that such a restriction was
not within Lockett's scope because, "Walton is not complaining
that the Arizona statute or practice excludes from consideration
any particular type of mitigating evidence; and it does not follow
from Lockett and its progeny that a State is precluded from specify-

ing how mitigating circumstances are to be proved."' 85 Justice
White also analogized to the Court's non-capital cases that allowed
the state at the guilt-innocence phase to place the burden of proof
186
for affirmative defenses on the defendant.
The plurality's cursory dismissal of Walton's claim is troubling
because Walton's argument was that Arizona's statute precluded
consideration of a "particular type of mitigating evidence," specifiArizona Supreme Court's construction of statutory section 13-703(c) (1989), which
places the burden of proof on the defendant. See State v. Gretzler, 135 Ariz. 42, 659
P.2d. 1 (1983).
185. Walton, 110 S. Ct. at 3055. The plurality also noted that Lockett expressly had
reserved the issue of whether the defendant could bear the burden of non-persuasion on
mitigating evidence. Id.; see Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 609 n.16 (1978).
186. Walton, 110 S.Ct. at 3055. Justice White's reliance on the affirmative defense
cases is intriguing, given that the McKoy Court earlier in the term had expressly rejected the cases as inapposite. The McKoy majority persuasively had pointed out that
the affirmative defense cases, Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228 (1987) (state may place
burden of persuasion on defendant for self-defense) and Patterson v. New York, 432
U.S. 197 (1977), (state may place burden of persuasion on defendant for heat-of-passion), were premised in part on the idea that the State was free to choose whether or not
even to create the affirmative defense. Lockett, in contrast, constitutionally mandates
that the relevant mitigating evidence be considered. See McKoy, 110 S.Ct. at 1233.
Thus Martin and Patterson'sjustification for placing the burden on the defendant, that
the greater power to decide whether to even recognize the defense includes the lesser
power to dictate which party proves the issue, does not apply to mitigating circumstances where the state is constitutionally required to allow their consideration.
Moreover, the fact-finder's decision concerning the use of mitigating evidence is
different in nature from its decision regarding affirmative defenses. With affirmative
defenses, the trier must decide "yes" or "no" as to its existence. The use of mitigating
evidence, on the other hand, is a qualitative judgment that may be based on the cumulative effect of evidence. Thus, although no one piece of mitigating evidence may persuade the sentencer that a sentence less than death is warranted, together they might
lead the sentencer to such a conclusion. See Walton, 110 S. Ct. at 3073-74 (Blackmun,
J., dissenting).
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cally evidence arguing for a sentence less than death but not proven
by a preponderance of the evidence. The state was not contending
that Walton's mitigating evidence-substance abuse and youthfulness-were not relevant under Lockett, nor that they were without
any persuasive value. Consequently, as the dissent noted, the evidentiary standard operated to "define[ ] a wide range of relevant
mitigating evidence--evidence with some degree of persuasiveness
which has not been proved by a preponderance-that cannot be
given effect by the capital sentencer."' 18 7
If the plurality had attempted to explain why the burden of
proof requirement was a "how" issue, its most likely reasoning
would have been that the sentencer was precluded from giving effect
to the evidence not because of its substance, but for nonsubstantive
concerns such as reliability. From this perspective, Lockett allows
the state to tell the sentencer what is sufficiently reliable mitigating
evidence to rely upon. Once the evidence is found reliable, however, the state may not preclude the sentencer from giving effect to
-the evidence. For example, a scheme not allowing mental retardation to be weighed as a mitigating factor because mental retardation
is not considered by the state to be relevant still would be invalid, 18
but a statute requiring the mental retardation to be proven by a
preponderance of the evidence would pass constitutional muster.
The acceptance of burden of proof requirements as permissible
state controls over "how" the sentencer considers evidence, however, creates a conflict with the cases striking down jury unanimity
requirements. The Walton plurality summarily distinguished the
cases on the basis that Arizona did not use the jury as the sentencer
and that the Mills and McKoy cases had not disapproved of instructions in those cases which had imposed a preponderance of the evidence standard.189 Although descriptively true, the differences fail
to explain why a unanimity, requirement, which attempts to establish reliability through consensus, invalidly tells the sentencer
"what" they can consider as mitigating evidence, while an evidentiary burden, which might preclude the jury from giving effect to
the very same evidence because of reliability concerns, is
permissible. 90
187. Walton, 110 S. Ct. at 3074.
188. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934 (1989) (Texas death penalty statute
invalidly precluded sentencer from considering defendant's mental retardation).
189. See Walton, 110 S. Ct. at 3055-56.
190. Justice Blackmun's dissent even posited a scenario for burden of proof require.
ments that paralled the "hold-out" juror scenario in Mills and McKoy:
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Perhaps an abstract distinction can be posited as to why burden of proof reliability is a procedural concern while consensus reliability goes to substance, but ultimately one is led to conclude that
Mills and McKoy are better characterized not as "what" cases, but
as illegitimate state attempts to control the procedure of how mitigating evidence is considered. If this understanding of the cases is
correct, then they become examples of instances in which a state's
procedural guidelines are invalid not because they preclude consideration of mitigating evidence based on substance, but because they
do not legitimately enhance reliability. This understanding is implicit in Justice Kennedy's McKoy concurrence: "The extreme control given to one juror in the North Carolina scheme in effect can
allow that juror alone to impose a capital sentence. It is that fact,
and not a novel application of Lockett to requirements intended to
enhance the reliability of the jury's findings, that is dispositive."' 19
The moral of Mills and McKoy from this perspective is that states
are allowed to enhance the reliability and rationality of the process,
but the procedures still must meet certain minimal constitutional
92
standards.
The Justices' disagreements in McKoy and Walton over what is
procedural and what is substantive suggests that the distinction has
significant elasticity. Since the advent of the "what-how" distinction, the Court has considered four procedures which operate on
some level to preclude jury consideration of certain mitigating evidence: a scheme that requires the sentencer to answer specific questions, jury unanimity requirements, burdens of proof, and antisympathy instructions. In those cases, two were invalidated as efforts by the state to control what mitigating evidence the sentencer
The problems with the preponderance standard are compounded when
the defendant presents several possible mitigating factors. A trial judge
might be 49% convinced as to each of 10 mitigating circumstances; yet
he would be forced to conclude, as a matter of law, that there was no
mitigation to weigh against the aggravating factors.
Id. at 3073-74. The Ninth Circuit, in one of the first post-Walton cases, concluded that
in an analogous setting Lockett and not Walton controlled and required the sentencer to
consider all the mitigating evidence together before deciding if it meets the burden of
proof. Smith v. McCormick, 914 F.2d 1153, 1168-69 (9th Cir. 1990). The court argued that to reject specific mitigating factors without weighing them all together in
effect precluded the sentencer from "giving effect" to all mitigating evidence and thus
amounted to telling the sentencer "what" they could consider as mitigating evidence.

Id.
191. McKoy v. North Carolina, 110 S. Ct. 1227, 1240 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
192. Justice Kennedy, for example, agreed with the characterization in Mills that
the " 'one juror veto' system ...[is] 'the height of arbitrariness.' " McKoy, 110 S. Ct. at
1240 (quoting Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 374 (1988)).
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could consider (special questions and unanimity requirements) 193
and two were upheld as valid procedural controls (burdens of proof
and anti-sympathy instructions). 194 In all of the cases, however,
there was disagreement over whether the challenged state requirement was in effect "guiding" (procedural) or "precluding" (substantive) the sentencer's consideration of the mitigating evidence,
making it evident that one Justice's procedure is another's substance. Moreover, one cannot be confident that even those requirements that the Court has ruled upon are now settled law, as at least
one lower court already has found that a requirement the Supreme
Court has ruled is procedural- burdens of proof for weighing mitigating evidence-may still be invalid as a substantive control if used
to prevent the sentencer from weighing all mitigating evidence
together. '95
The inability to identify where substance stops and procedure
begins not only creates uncertainty within the law, it poses a distinct danger to Lockett itself. After Walton, the door has been
opened for a state to attach requirements to the sentencer's use of
mitigating evidence so long as it has first allowed the sentencer to
hear the evidence. What remains to be seen is whether the Court
will uphold procedures that allow the states to accomplish indirectly what Lockett forbids directly: determining for the sentencer
what mitigating evidence may be used in deciding if the death penalty is appropriate. For example, after Walton, may a state that
believes a mandatory death penalty is appropriate for a certain
crime effectuate that result by requiring the sentencer to find that
any mitigating evidence presented by the defendant can justify a
sentence less than death only if it "overwhelmingly calls for a sen193. McKoy, 110 S. Ct. 1227 and Mills, 486 U.S. 367 (jury unanimity); Penry v.
Lynaugh, 109 S.Ct. 2934 (1989) (special questions). In Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S.
164 (1988), a majority of the Court agreed that the use of special questions was constitutional for the particular mitigating evidence at issue (prior prison disciplinary record
and residual doubt), but left open the possibility that the scheme may be unconstitutional under different facts. In Penry, the Court found such an occasion had arisen.
194. See Walton v. Arizona, 110 S. Ct. 3047 (1990) (burden of proof); Saffie v.
Parks, 110 S. Ct. 1257, 1261 (1990) (arguing, inter alia, that challenge to anti-sympathy
instruction goes to telling jury "how" to consider mitigating evidence and is outside
Lockett's scope).
195. See Smith v. McCormick, 914 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1990). The court concluded
that if specific mitigating factors were never considered together because standing alone
they failed to meet the requisite burden of proof, the burden of proof standard now
operated to preclude the sentencer from giving effect to valid mitigating evidence, i.e.
mitigating evidence which weighed together would call for a sentence less than death.
Id. at 1168-69.
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tence less than death"? 96 Does such a provision "guide" or "preclude" the sentencer's use of the mitigating evidence?
The cases striking down jury unanimity requirements provide
some reason to believe that even if such a measure is viewed as a
procedural device, its extremely high threshold of proof might be
seen as arbitrary. The almost inescapable conclusion, however, is
that the Court is now intent on giving the states significant control
over evidence which is substantively within Lockett's protection.
Moreover, Lockett is placed in a no-win situation, because to the
extent the Court does strike down state requirements (either because it decides the controls are substantive rather than procedural,
or, if procedural, arbitrary) it gives greater force to Justice Scalia's
claim that the whole area is so confusing and unpredictable that
Lockett should be abandoned. Indeed, the only prediction that can
be made with any certainty is that the debate over Lockett's role
and its proper scope will not be resolved for the foreseeable future.
CONCLUSION

With his usual powerful rhetoric, Justice Scalia has painted a
picture of two constitutional doctrines- controlled discretion and
individualized consideration-on a collision course. The Court is
portrayed on the one hand as riding herd over the states to drive
unbridled discretion out of the death penalty and then schizophrenically turning around and demanding that open-ended discretion be
allowed back into the death penalty decision. A reader of Justice
Scalia's Walton concurrence quite likely could walk away shaking
her head at how the United States Supreme Court could have tolerated, let alone created, a framework of principles so at odds with
itself.
This Article's purpose has not been to deny that a tension between Furman and Lockett exists, but to address the question of
whether the tension amounts to an irreconcilable conflict. For
while the cases necessitate different approaches to sentencer discretion, Furman narrowing it and Lockett expanding it, they share the
goal of identifying which defendants are within the state's power to
execute under the eighth amendment. The crucial question, therefore, is whether the means of implementing their principles invariably are drawn into conflict.
196. Cf. Walton, 110 S. Ct. at 3076 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("IT]he right to present mitigating evidence is rendered all but meaningless if the rules that guide the sentencer's deliberations virtually ensure that the mitigating evidence will not change the
outcome.").
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As a starting point, it must be recognized that the question is
not an all-or-nothing one between discretion or no discretion.
Furman did not condemn all discretion, but only discretion that
yielded arbitrary and capricious results. Furthermore, because even
Lockett's opponents do not appear to maintain that the only constitutional death penalty is a mandatory one, the issue can be further
refined to asking where on a continuum does discretion for individualized consideration become too great. More specifically, is Lockett's definition of relevant mitigating evidence too far down the
continuum?
Justice Scalia contends that Lockett does produce "freakish"
results, citing a host of potential mitigating factors that a sentencer
must be allowed to consider under Lockett. His assumption, however, is that the sentencer will be unable to apply those factors in a
rational and consistent fashion. If evidence should materialize
someday that sentencers are applying mitigating evidence in an arbitrary fashion, a showdown will occur between Furman and Lockett. As of now, however, Justice Scalia is offering only one
particular view of whether sentencers are capable of making the
"reasoned moral judgment" called for by Lockett. His viewpoint
stands in contrast to that of the Lockett plurality, which crafted its
inclusive definition of mitigating evidence precisely because it believed that more reliable death penalty decisions would result.
It is particularly important to examine carefully the underlying
assumptions for overruling Lockett to ensure that the rationale for
such an action is clear. If Woodson and Lockett truly do produce
the arbitrary and capricious results condemned by Furman, then
the Court needs to make such specific findings and resolve the conflict. The danger, however, is that the Court will overrule or severely limit Woodson -Lockett on the basis that it violates Furman,
when the Court's real objection is that the principle of individualized consideration removes too much power from the states. Certainly reversing Woodson and Lockett's interpretation of the eighth
amendment is within the Court's power, but it should address the
question directly rather than suggesting that its hand is being forced
because of an irreconcilable conflict between Furman and Lockett.
Although Lockett has withstood Justice Scalia's salvo, at least
for the moment, the future role of mitigating evidence is still very
much in jeopardy. In Walton v. Arizona, the Court for the first time
allowed a state to place mitigating circumstances within Lockett's
definition of relevance, evidence arguing for a sentence less than
death, beyond the sentencer's consideration. Under Walton, the
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state's reason for preventing consideration of evidence apparently
must be procedural and aimed at enhancing reliability. However,
so long as the state can structure its scheme such that any relevant
mitigating evidence is presented and considered by the sentencer,
even if the consideration involves rejecting the factor based on a
state-imposed evidentiary standard, the Court will review such standards under an analysis that appears to resemble a rational basis
test. Lockett's core barrier against state definition of what is a relevant mitigating factor remains, but the barrier has shrunk considerably as the Court has granted to the states control over procedures
to ensure reliability.
Most fundamentally, the Court's approval of evidentiary burdens makes clear that a majority embraces the view that the death
penalty can be implemented as a calculated decision based upon objective fact-finding and "reasoned moral" judgment. In contrast to
its immediate post-Furman decisions, the Court increasingly has
viewed the death penalty decision as a subset, albeit a somewhat
unique one, of traditional factual and evidentiary issues. As a result, the Court has exhibited greater comfort with states exercising
their traditional power to control the sentencer's decision-making
process. This state of affairs would not have been possible if the
Court viewed the death penalty decision as including elements of
compassion and mercy and had constitutionally required that the
sentencer be permitted to give those factors effect.

